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The present thesis seeks to develop a better understanding of how political images 
and symbols of power were constructed during the Russian Civil War through a 
textual analysis of the presentation surrounding the leader of the anti-Bolshevik 
movement in Siberia, Aleksandr Kolchak.  The research was based primarily on the 
collection of microfilmed “anti-Soviet” newspapers available at the Library of 
Congress, while also expanding on the theoretical contributions of Wortman, 
Kolonitskii, and Holquist to the study of power in revolutionary Russia.  The thesis 
focuses on the construction of a stylized representation of Admiral Kolchak by 
Kadets in Omsk, and how his public image was transformed to reflect the ideological 
goals and beliefs of the White movement.  The political mythmaking of the Whites 
reveal that they, contrary to previous assessments, were fully engaged in propaganda 
campaigns and that Kolchak himself must be viewed within the wider revolutionary 
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“Drink, comrade, wherever you can, to drown life’s sorrows 
Softer, softer, all our worries will go tonight. 
Maybe this time tomorrow 
The Cheka will get here 












 Writing in exile, Paul Miliukov offered this description of the former Supreme Ruler of 
All Russia, the leader of the White movement in Siberia, Admiral Aleksandr Vasilievich 
Kolchak: 
A man of noble character and heart, he was, however, a freshman in politics and thus bound to 
depend on other people’s opinions for arriving at the most important and responsible political 
decisions.  He had no personal ambition and there was not a jot of the dictator in him.  The 
reputation of an “iron will” did not at all correspond with his real nature, extremely sensitive and 





Miliukov’ analysis of Kolchak, while insightful, is apologetic and filled with lament over the 
failed reign of the man who many regarded as the only legitimate challenger to Bolshevik power 
and the gains of the October Revolution.  Miliukov’s position as a staunch anti-Bolshevik and 
former leader of the Constitutional Democratic Party (Kadets) has certainly colored his writings 
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on the events of the Civil War, and he (along with many others in the historiography) sought to 
detach the Admiral’s personal legacy from the ill-fated Omsk government he presided over.  
While Miliukov’s account may be historically dubious, what is significant for the purposes of 
this investigation is the evocative, theatrical language he employs to describe Kolchak. 
 In turn, this paper will attempt to answer a deceptively simple question: What kind of 
“mask” (or rather, masks) did Admiral Kolchak wear as Supreme Ruler of All Russia?  Taking 
this basic question a step further, if Kolchak was in fact simply an actor, as Miliukov and many 
others has suggested (“bound to depend on other people’s opinions…”
3
), then what character did 
he play?  How was his character created and conceived, what were his motivations, and what 
was his role within the larger theatrical performance?  If the Admiral himself was the lead 
player, then who was the director (or directors), and what did he want to show and communicate 
to the audience?  Finally, what were the aesthetic dimensions of the production?   
Let us now imagine that Admiral Kolchak (or rather, his image) has taken center stage, 
the curtain has risen; all the audience’s eyes and attentions are fixed on him.  While the primary 
purpose of this paper is to analyze the stylized, public representation of Supreme Ruler, it is not 
of secondary importance to investigate the happenings and machinations backstage.  As the 
famous playwright and theater theorist Bertolt Brecht wrote, “Not everything depends on the 
actor, even though nothing may be done without taking him into account.  The ‘story’ is set out, 
brought forward and shown by the theater as a whole, by actors, stage designers, mask-makers,
4
 
costumiers, composers and choreographers.  They unite their various arts for the joint operation, 
without of course sacrificing their independence in the process.”
5
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Who were the Admiral’s “mask-makers” and “costumiers,” and how did they contribute 
to the production?  This paper will argue that those behind stage, that is, in the Omsk 
government, played a decisive and fundamental role in shaping and stylizing the public 
presentations and image of Admiral Kolchak.  As William Rosenberg has convincingly 
demonstrated, the governmental apparatus and administrative structures were remarkably 
homogenous in their makeup: nearly all members in positions of true significance were members 
of the Constitutional Democratic Party (Kadets), and even within that, the most powerful were 
members of the Party’s Eastern Section of the Central Committee (VOTsK), which was notorious 
for its conservative and nationalistic ideas.
6
  It was these men, who controlled nearly every major 
ministry or department (as Rosenberg notes, Kadets had more influence in Kolchak’s 
government than “…in any other anti-Bolshevik government, including Skoropadskii’s 
Ukrainian Hetmanate.”
7
) also turned considerable attention to developing and cultivating an 
image of their leader, which fully embodied their ideological and political beliefs, and their 
aspirations for the future of Russia. 
 Taking leave of the theatrical metaphors, the focus of this paper will be on the public 
presentation and stylized representation of Admiral Aleksandr Kolchak that was directed towards 
to the populations under his rule.  The image of Kolchak, presented in the “modern” mediums of 
propaganda, newspapers, and posters was an important symbol and lightning rod to both his 
supporters and enemies, both domestically and abroad.  To many of those fighting against the 
Bolsheviks and the socialist revolution, the image of Kolchak represented one of the brightest 
hopes for victory over the Reds, the restoration of bourgeois law and order, and preservation of 
Russia’s national honor; to his enemies, he was the pure manifestation of counterrevolution and 
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 4 
reaction, and was a synecdoche of the capitalist, landowning classes who were desperately 
clinging to the old Tsarist order.
8
 Thus the Supreme Ruler was firmly in the center of the 
revolutionary discourse and conflict over the form and identity of post-Tsarist power and 
authority that consumed all levels of society. 
While these dual images of Kolchak were in many ways fashioned and nurtured by those 
ordinary people who consumed and transformed them to fit their own preexisting perceptions of 
revolutionary events and the subsequent civil war, the focus of this paper will not be on the 
reception of public images and representations and their validity vis-à-vis the “truth,” but rather 
on their deliberate and stylistic construction by members of the Omsk government and anti-
Bolshevik intellectuals and leaders throughout the country.  Public representations and images of 
political leaders are important to study and analyze, and as Jan Plamper has recently argued, they 
played a central role in the development of European political thought and the creation of the 
“modern personality cult” that emerged in the latter half of the nineteenth century.
9
  
Understanding the creative process of fashioning of “masks” of the modern political leader can 
also yield valuable insight into the goals and aspirations of the political movement the image 
seeks to represent; as Clifford Geertz has argued, “Thrones may be out of fashion, and pageantry 




The deliberate construction of a stylized representation of the Supreme Ruler Admiral 
Kolchak must be viewed in the context of the rapid emergence of other “personality cults” in 
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 5 
Russia during the revolutionary period.  Boris Kolinitskii and Orlando Figes have convincingly 
argued that despite the deposition of the Tsar and the end of the Romanov monarchy, “The 
Russian people, or at least the peasants, conceived of politics in monarchial terms.”
11
 The 
authors argue that although the people viewed politics through what they call “monarchial 
psychology,” it does not mean that they sought or even sympathized with the idea of restoring 
the monarchy and the old order; rather, it meant that they were “receptive to authoritarian or 
patriarchal leaders,” who had the potential to “fill…the vacuum left by the myth of the Tsar as 
the people’s savior and liberator.”
12
  Thus, the stage was set and prepared for those leaders with 
the ability to seize the audience’s attention and play off of Russia’s long historical tradition of 
authoritarian, autocratic rule. 
However, Figes and Kolonitskii do not mention or address the construction of a “cult of 
Kolchak”; rather, they focus on the development of the personality cults of Vladimir Lenin and 
Lavr Kornilov, with special attention given to the case of Aleksandr Kerensky.  After the 
February Revolution, Aleksandr Kerensky rose to prominence and attempted to fill that 
“vacuum” or void left by the fall of Tsar Nicholas II and the destruction of the sacral and 
“loving” image of the Tsar and the monarchy during the First World War, which had served as a 
connection between the monarchy and the people.
13
  Using modern mass media tools like 
newspapers, posters, and film, Kerensky and his followers attempted to construct a “cult of the 
leader” that ultimately failed to take hold due to the increasing polarization of Russian society 
and politics.
14
  This in turn gave way to the development of two competing “leader cults” that 
                                                 
11
 Orlando Figes and Boris Kolonitskii, Interpreting the Russian Revolution: The Language and Symbols of 
Power (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999), 72. 
12
 Ibid, 72. 
13
 Boris Kolonitskii, Tragicheskaya Erotika: Obrazy imperatorskoi sem’i v gody Pervoi mirovoi voiny 
(Sankt-Peterburg: Novoye Literaturnoye Obozrenie, 2010), 11-14. 
14
 Ibid, 71-96. 
 
 6 
articulated and represented the interests and goals of both the left and the right.  Lenin and 
Kornilov became something larger than just two opposing political leaders; they both came to 
embody the very essence of their respective movements, and to many people the separation 




Thus, in many ways, the construction of the image of the Supreme Ruler (Verkhovnyi 
Pravitel’) Admiral Kolchak should be viewed as a continuation of the “leader cults” that were 
developed earlier during the revolution, especially the cult of Kornilov.  It is important to note 
that this representation was a synecdoche for the movement as a whole, and for those unseen 
who stood behind the leader (backstage).  Lenin was a stand in for the Communist Party and for 
the international communist struggle as a whole; Kornilov represented the officers and those of 
the rightist persuasion (including many monarchists).  While there is bountiful evidence to show 
that a personality cult was being constructed, in earnest, for Kolchak, his government fell before 
it could fully mature or catch.
16
 Therefore, throughout this paper, instead of “personality cult,” 
the term “stylized representation” will be employed.  This term accurately captures the intent and 
purpose of this process, without being constrained by language that has specific conditions and is 
often a source of considerable debate within the historical field. 
The vehicle that made possible the widespread production and dissemination of these 
representations and images of leaders was the modern mass media, specifically the newspaper, 
which underwent a meteoric rise in significance and importance in the latter half of the 
nineteenth century.  As Peter Kenez notes, “In the modern world, the press has had a decisively 
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important role in spreading political ideologies.”
17
  While Tsarist Russia during this time did not 
nurture or reap the benefits from a well-developed newspaper culture (historians have long 
debated whether Imperial Russia possessed, in any sense of the term, what Jurgen Habermas 
famously termed “the public sphere”
18
), both Richard Wortman and Louise McReynolds have 
demonstrated that newspapers were an important feature of Russian society, and were often used 




Therefore, this study will utilize daily and weekly newspapers as a central source and 
model for analyzing the transmission of representations and images of the Supreme Leader to the 
masses of Russian society.  Using newspapers as a central source can be difficult and misleading 
at times, and one must take into account the inherently distorting nature of propaganda and the 
selective dissemination of information.  As well, daily newspapers provide a window not only 
into the rapidly evolving popular and mass culture of the day, but also, as Louis McReynolds 
notes, “[they are] at once the story of political, social, cultural, and economic change.”
20
 These 
concerns are especially relevant for studying a regime like Kolchak’s, which was marked by 
heavy censorship and the almost total absence of a free press.  Despite these prevailing 
conditions, mass media can still be an excellent indicator of the regime’s attempt to 
communicate with its population, however one-sided and propagandistic the exchange is; it can 
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also provide insight into the regime’s self-perception and conceptions of its own legitimacy, 
which, during the Civil War period, is a topic that must be explored at length.  Thus, this 
investigation, in the words of historian Victoria Bonnell in her influential study of Bolshevik 
propaganda, is “based on the assumption that official ideology mattered.”
21
  Ideology did matter 
to those in the Omsk government, as any insult to the image (izobrazhenie) of the Supreme Ruler 
through words, letters, or writing was punishable by execution by firing squad.
22
  
The central of argument of this paper is that Admiral Kolchak in fact wore two different, 
but not completely separate masks as Supreme Ruler of All Russia.  In both theatrical and 
anthropological studies, the purpose of studies of masks is often to reveal what lies beneath; the 
intention of this study is to analyze and deconstruct the mask itself, leaving what is beneath for 
further studies.  Throughout the newspapers surveyed and available secondary materials, it is 
clear that those shaping the stylized representation of Kolchak sought to accentuate two distinct, 
and often overlapping, character traits of the leader of the anti-Bolshevik struggle in Russia.  The 
two sides that were publically emphasized in Kolchak were not simply descriptions of his 
character, nor were they drawn exclusively from the events of his past.  Rather, Kolchak’s image 
was stylized and constructed to reflect the objectives, aspirations, and beliefs of the members of 
the Kadet dominated anti-Bolshevik government based in Omsk.  The Admiral’s two masks were 
The Military Man and The Statesman, committed to establishing law and order.  Each of the 
masks (which could be worn separately or simultaneously) represented the shared, fundamental 
ideological pillars of those Kadets in the Omsk government and those abroad who were not only 
fighting Bolshevism, but also envisioning what Russia and Russian society would look like after 
their victory. 
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The discussion in previous paragraphs has left out a central question that should be 
answered before proceeding further: why study the failed government of Admiral Kolchak?  
Although the reign of Kolchak and the Omsk government was short-lived (the time from his 
coup d’état to the fall of Omsk at the hands of the Bolsheviks lasted a little less than a year), its 
significance to the Russian Civil War and the anti-Bolshevik struggle as a whole should not be 
understated.  As the Bolshevik leader Leon Trotsky warned in a speech to the Red Army in April 
1919, “Nevertheless, it would be criminal frivolity on our part to disregard the danger 
represented by the White Guardist bands of Kolchak on the east.”
23
  During the winter and spring 
months of 1919, the armies of Admiral Kolchak had captured the major Ural industrial cities of 
Perm’, Chelyabinsk, Ufa and Yekaterinburg, and were within striking distance of the city of 
Kazan’ and the strategically important Volga River, which afforded the possibility of a link-up 
with the Armed Forces of South Russia under the command of Anton I. Denikin.
24
  One 
optimistic British news correspondent for The Times in Omsk, in April 1919, predicted that the 
Bolshevik regime was on the brink of total collapse, and that Kolchak’s forces would reach 
Moscow within three months.
25
 
 Kolchak’s armies never did reach Moscow, and by the summer of 1919 they were in full-
scale retreat across the Urals in the face of the newly reconstituted Red Army.  Omsk fell the 
following November, and Admiral Kolchak (after being betrayed by the members of the 
Czechoslovak Legion on his way to his new capital) was executed in February in Irkutsk by 
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members of the local Bolshevik government.
26
 Despite the curtain’s early fall on the Kolchak 
regime, the Admiral’s legacy and impact on the Russian Civil War were not as ephemeral as his 
time in power.  As noted earlier, for many people during this tumultuous time, Kolchak 
represented a beacon of hope, a safe port in the terribly stormy waters of civil conflict.  The 
famous diarist and prominent historian Iurii V. Got’e wrote longingly from Moscow of that 
“mythical government of Kolchak,”
27
 and after Kolchak’s execution at the hands of the 
Bolsheviks, he lamented “Thus do they destroy all outstanding Russian men.”
28
 
 The war in the East against Kolchak also had a significant impact on the Bolshevik 
leadership, and was trumpeted as one of the most complete victories of the Civil War.  The 
setback at Perm’ had forced the Red Army commanders, specifically Leon Trotsky and Ioakim 
Vatsetis, to rapidly reform and redeploy their armies and to fundamentally alter their approach to 
the conflict.  In April 1919, the Central Committee of the Bolsheviks identified Kolchak as the 
primary threat to Soviet power, and subsequently diverted vast amounts of resources and men to 
conflict in the East.
29
 Subsequently, the Red Armies drove Kolchak’s forces beyond the Urals 
and back into Siberia, creating along the way legendary Soviet heroes like Mikhail Frunze and 
Vasilii Chapaev, who was immortalized in Dmitrii Furmanov’s Soviet classic, Chapaev.  After 
the end of the Civil War, in a speech to the First All-Russia Congress of Working Cossacks, 
Lenin reminded those in attendance, “I do not know if any person still remains who has not been 
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The central argument of this work is that members of the White government in Omsk not 
only understood the power that propaganda and modern forms of mass communication provided, 
but actively created and promoted a stylized ideological identity of their regime that was largely 
expressed through the representation of the Supreme Ruler Aleksandr Kolchak.  The ideological 
foundations of the government were articulated through daily newspapers and brochures that 
presented Admiral Kolchak as the legitimate message bearer of the anti-Bolshevik movement 
and the symbol of resistance to the October Revolution.  The articles and pictorials that 
accompanied them were highly allegorical and drew heavily on precedents in both Russian and 
world history (such as the Roman Empire) to present the Supreme Ruler as the hero of the 
Motherland who would lead Russia out of the gauntlet of fratricidal war.
31
 Through the mass 
press and ceremony, Kolchak embodied the symbols and convictions of the Omsk government, 
and his personal traits were shaped to reflect his ability to command and to establish a new and 
healthy Russian state, a task of the utmost necessity given the White’s apocalyptic predictions of 
the results of a Bolshevik victory.  Thus, discussions of Admiral Kolchak and more broadly, the 
White movement, must be placed firmly within the context of the emergence of new ideological 
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and discursive currents regarding authority that were crystalized by the complete collapse of 
society and order during what Peter Holquist termed Russia’s “Epoch of Violence.”
32
 
To examine “The Admiral’s Masks,” this paper will deconstruct and separate the various 
aspects (masks) of Kolchak’s image and public presentation.  The material that will be analyzed 
will be both textual and visual; one does not need images to create a complete “image” of a 
person, and emphasis will be placed on textual documents like newspapers and brochures, which 
were utilized by the Russian Press Bureau in Omsk to transmit a clear representation of the 
Supreme Ruler to the people across Russia.  The rapidly growing sphere of “popular culture” and 
mass media during the revolutionary period was in part shaped by various groups who sought to 
influence public opinion and despite previous arguments about White propaganda, and those in 
the anti-Bolshevik movement understood and participated in this dynamic process.  Kolchak’s 
regime coordinated with and directly controlled hundreds of newspapers in Omsk and throughout 
the territories under their control that presented a clear and accessible image of power that was 
designed to appeal to different segments of society and unite them towards a common goal.  As 
well, the term “popular culture” must be reevaluated when it comes to discussions about 
newspapers and the press, and as Roger Chartier has suggested, “it no longer seems tenable to try 
to establish strict correspondences between cultural cleavages and social hierarchies, creating 
simplistic relationships between particular cultural objects or forms and specific social groups,” 
and that, “the macroscopic opposition ‘between popular’ and ‘high’ culture has lost its 
pertinence.”
33
 Therefore the newspapers of the Omsk regime must be viewed as a collecting 
point for different strategies to appeal to and connect with different social groups and 
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organizations that all consumed the same form of mass culture regardless of background; for 
example, simple and nationalistic slogans placed in the same issue as discussions by the Kadet 
intellectual M.M. Fedorov about the relationship of power to society in Russia.
34
 
While the collection of anti-Bolshevik newspapers at the Library of Congress contains a 
geographically expansive collection of publications from all cities under White control, this 
investigation will focus primarily on newspapers and printed sources from the capital of Admiral 
Kolchak’s government, Omsk.  This reflects both practical and methodological concerns.  The 
vast amount of sources from all across Russia between the years 1918-1921, ranging from small 
to large publications, presents a challenge of focus and attention given the time and space 
restrictions of an investigation of this nature.  Although limiting the research parameters to just 
one city necessarily affects the conclusions that can be drawn about the anti-Bolshevik 
experience in Siberia as a whole, Omsk’s position as the political, economic, and cultural capital 
of the regime provides a more national orientation.  Omsk was the headquarters of both the 
Russian Press Bureau (Russkoe biuro pechati) and the military propaganda wing Osved (with its 
countless smaller departments), which accounted for a vast majority of the publications and 
circulation numbers in White Siberia.  The press organizations in Omsk were provided with large 
allocations from the government’s budget, and although though there were newspaper shortages 
across the country, the capital remained a collection point for newspapers from across the 
country.  Though there are no real available circulation (tirazh) statistics for Kolchak’s 
government, Guins notes that one of the smaller papers published in Omsk, Nasha Gazeta, had a 
circulation of over 20,000 copies.
35
 Many of the other newspapers printed in cities under White 
control reprinted the declarations, articles, and brochures that were produced in Omsk, as the 
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government coordinated with local press authorities and departments of Osved to present a 
unified message from the regime.  
It is important, however, not to endow the ideological and propaganda efforts of the 
Omsk government with more coherence and structure than is deserved.  Although significant 
measures were undertaken to engage and sway the Russian people to their cause, the propaganda 
of the regime (and to a degree, the whole White movement) failed to achieve its purpose and was 
much less effective and sophisticated than the Bolshevik’s legendary “agitprop” campaigns.  The 
different departments of Osved were constantly in competition with each other and often chose to 
focus on narrow episodes that served their respective interests rather than larger and national 
events; Guins described these branches of Osved as a “hydra,” able to grow seven heads in place 
of one.  There was also question of whether the money allocated to the press services was 
actually used printing and distribution, and finances often served as a central factor in the 
escalating and ultimately destructive conflict between the military and civilian press agencies.
36
 
The relative ambiguity of the terms and key phrases used by the government and the often-
contradictory statements of the Supreme Ruler and the military authorities further contributed to 
the opacity of the regime’s ideological message.  While the significance of the White’s attempt 
to use propaganda and modern forms of mass communication should not be downplayed, one 
must be careful not to make their arguments more clearly than they could.    
The purpose of this investigation is to fill in a gap within the western historiography in 
regards to White propaganda and culture.  It has long been the argument that one of the central 
reasons for the White’s defeat during the civil war was their inability to utilize modern forms of 
communication like propaganda and to develop a clearly defined political and ideological 
message.  As Peter Kenez noted in his influential work The Birth of the Propaganda State, “The 
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military men [White leaders] were deeply suspicious of propagandists and politicians, and they 
did not understand the importance of the contribution that civilians could make…In the struggle 
of ideas, the Whites proved themselves to be feeble fighters.”
37
 Although there have been some 
notable recent works that focused on the development and evolution of White propaganda,
38
 
there has yet to be a comprehensive study that incorporates the methodological and theoretical 
developments in the study of Bolshevik and communist propaganda and ideology.  Additionally, 
there has been no serious attempt in English to deconstruct or understand “White culture,” and 
what everyday life was like under Belogvardeishchina.  While this investigation in small in 
scope, it is an attempt to augment and expand our understanding of White propaganda and 
culture, and specifically how the leaders of the anti-Bolshevik movement envisioned their own 
power and claims to legitimate authority.  
Beginning with the first wave of émigré memoirs after the solidification of Soviet power 
in 1922, the scholarly literature of the Russian Civil War has been largely slanted towards 
investigation and analysis of the Bolsheviks and their revolutionary program, at the expense of 
the anti-Bolshevik movement.  This can in part be explained by the fact that Lenin and the 
Bolsheviks ultimately won the war, and had a chance to create a state and society that was indeed 
revolutionary and that altered the balance of world affairs for nearly 70 years.  The construction 
of the new Soviet state drew many left-leaning intellectuals to visit or simply imagine the 
country and to write about the transformation that was being undertaken.  Tremendous scholarly 
attention was directed towards the ideology, politics, and culture of the Soviet regime and its 
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major figures, and studies on the revolutionary period were primarily constructed as a way to 
understand how the Bolsheviks were able to seize control of the vast expanses of the former 
Russian Empire.  After the Second World War and the ensuing Cold War, academic camps were 
methodologically divided between attempts to better understand and analyze the history of the 
USSR and works that sought to paint the grimmest and most condemning image of Soviet power.  
Missing from both of these discussions was any serious analysis of the enemies of the 
Bolsheviks, whom they had to overcome to take control and who helped shape the 
revolutionary’s conception of power and conflict.   
The dimensions and features of the White movement during the Russian Civil War have 
been largely relegated to secondary status in the major works on the revolutionary period.  
During the Cold War, the Whites did not fit into the meta-narratives that were developed to 
theorize and explain the rise of the Soviet Union as a global power.  E.H. Carr notes in his 
massive work The Bolshevik Revolution that the Whites were not worth more than a passing 
mention, while Sheila Fitzpatrick’s The Russian Revolution barely mentions anti-Bolshevik 
movement at all, and Richard Pipes’ chronicle relegates the entire civil war to a minor episode of 
the revolutionary period.
39
  Even with the opening of the archives in 1991, some scholars refused 
to abandon the antiquated and simple models for viewing the civil war and the Whites, which in 
large part was informed by the early Soviet historians’ Marxist analysis of the conflict.  More 
recent popular histories that have mentioned the White movement had tended to focus on the 
inevitability of its collapse by enumerating all of the contradictions and failures of their policies.  
Orlando Figes concludes, “The problem of the Russian counter-revolution was precisely that it 
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 while Arno Mayer simply states: “All in all, the Whites were a 
microcosm of the ruling and governing classes of the ancien regime – military officers, 
landowners, bureaucrats, churchman – with minimal popular support.”
41
 
The majority of historians who have written about revolution have perpetuated the 
telescoping of eventual defeat on the analysis of the anti-Bolshevik movement, but there are 
some notable exceptions.  Peter Kenez’s groundbreaking work on the Volunteer Army and the 
anti-Bolshevik movement in southern Russia was the first Western account to utilize a wide 
variety of published memoirs and archival holdings in the Hoover Archive in Stanford and the 
Bakhmetieff Collection at Columbia.
42
  Kenez’s work was significant because it departed from 
the traditional narrative of inevitable defeat and instead focused on the ideology of the 
movement’s leaders and the political and military structures of administration.  Building on the 
foundations laid by Kenez, Peter Holquist’s seminal work Making War, Forging Revolution 
expanded the theoretical boundaries of the study of the Whites and demonstrated that there was a 
need to rethink the label of “counterrevolutionary.”
43
 Holquist argued that the upheavals of the 
revolution must be viewed within the context of crisis and violence in Russia that began with the 
First World War, and that both the Reds and Whites engaged in similar, “modern” practices that 
were determined by new conceptions of power and order.  Making War, Forging Revolution 
revealed that, far from being backwards thinking counterrevolutionaries seeking to preserve the 
old order, the Whites understood the power of modern techniques such as propaganda, 
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surveillance and data collection, and should ultimately be viewed more as competing 
revolutionaries than restorationists. 
 The contributions of Kenez, Holquist and others (notably including Russian historian 
Oleg Budnitskii)
44
 to the study of the Whites during the civil war have focused primarily on the 
conflict in the South, which had long been romanticized in Soviet culture and literature.  Much 
less attention, however, has been given to the anti-Bolshevik movement in the East under 
Admiral Aleksandr Kolchak.  The conflict in Siberia did not occupy Soviet imagination and 
myth like tales of the Volunteer Army and battles in Crimea, and there was neither a Siberian 
Sholokhov nor an eastern Tikhii Don.
45
 The same could be said about the West, where Denikin 
and Wrangel became mythical figures with memoirs published in English, while Kolchak and 
Kappel largely passed into the dustbins of history.  A published collection of documents 
including Admiral Kolchak’s final testimony before Bolshevik inquisitors spurred the 
publication of some general accounts after the Second World War, but the topic remained largely 
understudied in the West throughout the Cold War.
46
    
During the 1990’s, a renewed interest in the Russian Revolution and civil war led to the 
publication of several studies that attempted to cast light on the dimensions of the conflict and 
the motivations of the White leaders.  N.G.O. Pereira’s White Siberia examined the politics of 
the anti-Bolshevik movement and the rise of Kolchak as military dictator, with a relatively novel 
approach of focusing on the civilian administration rather than the military authorities and staff 
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 W. Bruce Lincoln’s Red Victory, despite taking a simplistic overview 
approach and covering the entire civil war, offers surprisingly deft insights into the causes of the 
collapse of Kolchak’s government.
48
 R.M. Connaughton’s Republic of Ushakova attempted to 
untangle the relationship between the Supreme Ruler and the Allies, but fell far short of the mark 
with analysis and failed to utilize any of the widely available memoirs and published documents 
in Russian.
49
 Many of these works largely replicated the narratives on the collapse of the Omsk 
government established by influential émigrés, particularly Paul Miliukov, which focused on the 
military’s usurpation of total power and the subsequent abuse and despotism of their rule.
50
 
While parts of the argument ring true, Miliukov’s writings are largely apologetic for the Kadet 
Party and tend to focus on the failures of groups around them instead of the party itself. 
Of all the western literature on the civil war in the East in the 1990’s, Jonathan Smele’s 
Civil War in Siberia remains an instant classic and ultimately the key secondary text in English 
on the topic.
51
  Smele’s encyclopedic (at nearly 750 pages it could qualify) endeavor skillfully 
synthesizes a wide range of English and Russian sources, as well as archival collections in Great 
Britain and the United States.  Smele provides a day-by-day account of the anti-Bolshevik 
movement in Siberia, beginning with the revolt of the Czechoslovak Legion and concluding with 
the last pockets of resistance in Vladivostok.  Political and economic issues are his primary 
concern, and he provides a vast array of charts and databases to present a complete picture of the 
Siberian economy under Kolchak’s rule.  Smele also offers a unique conclusion about the fall of 
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the Whites in the East by arguing that it was ultimately economic and geographical challenges 
that spelled the failure for the movement, instead of the long-accepted notion that the Whites’ 
arrogance, despotism, and lack of understanding in politics sealed their fate. 
One of the major shortcomings of Smele’s work, however, is the major omission of any 
cultural details or theorizing about life under White rule.  While he pays close attention to White 
newspapers as a source, there is almost no discussion of the role of propaganda and the mass 
press in defining the regime’s conception of power and legitimacy.  Even though his account fills 
in many gaps in our understanding of the period, his straightforward and pragmatic approach 
leaves the reader longing for a more balanced picture beyond the politicking of the government’s 
major figures.  He also largely perpetuates some of the long-held myths about Kolchak himself, 
arguing that he had a weak will and little actual input on policy decisions.  Additionally, Smele 
willfully disregards the archival holdings in Russia that he did not utilize, and he notes: “It has 
always been the author’s judgment, however, that the Soviet/Russian archives can yield little 
significant information additional to that to be found in the copious materials sent or carried out 
of Siberia…”
52
 Beyond Smele’s Civil War in Siberia, another significant source for this 
investigation are the memoirs and autobiographies of those participated in the conflict.  
The émigrés who fled Omsk after the fall of Kolchak’s government in the winter of 1919 
spread across the globe and formed large communities in cities like Kharbin, Paris, San 
Francisco, and New York City.  Although their writings remained largely outside major 
developments and themes in historical investigation in the 20
th
 century, the former generals and 
officials of the Omsk government penned many works detailing their experience in the anti-
Bolshevik movement in Siberia (few of which were translated into English).  A former minister 
of the Kolchak regime, Georg K. Guins, wrote perhaps the most complete and perceptive of 
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these White memoirs, which was bolstered by his own personal involvement in high-level 
decisions in the Council of Ministers.  Guins’ work, Sibir’, Soiuzniki, i Kolchak’, has been the 
most widely cited source among historians of the White movement in the East due to its clear 
and comprehensive reminiscences of the inner-workings of the government, as well as providing 
penetrating analysis and insight into the regime’s ultimate demise.
53
   
Guins, although a fervent anti-Bolshevik and supporter of Kolchak, was deeply critical of 
the right-wing factions who largely controlled the government, and of the incompetence of 
military officials who prevented the more moderate officials from pursuing necessary reforms.  
His memoirs read more like an analytical assessment than a nostalgic elegy, with thematic 
organization and seemingly third-person commentary on events that Guins participated directly 
in.  As with any memoir or autobiography Guins’ work must be approached critically, but it 
provides the most cogent overview of the White’s Siberian episode without the sympathetic and 
melancholy overtones that dominates much of the other literature of the émigrés. 
Other major figures of the Omsk government left their own accounts and opinions of the 
course of events, including the former Prime Minister Petr Vologodskii, Foreign Minister Ivan 
Sukin, the generals Sakharov, Filat’ev, Budberg, Molchanov, and Kolchak’s former subordinate 
Admiral Smirnov.
54
  While they provide a fruitful lens to view the goals, aspirations, and 
ultimate disappointments of ardent supports of the anti-Bolshevik movement, their memoirs lack 
the seeming omniscience of Guins, and are colored by attempts to blame outside forces for the 
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regime’s collapse and apologies for its controversial and often violent policies.  The White 
émigré memoirs do serve a strong counterbalance to the works of Soviet historians and 
memoirists, who often treat Kolchak and the Whites as being nothing more than pure 
counterrevolutionaries and revanchists who were all blindly obsessed with the restoration of the 
monarchy.  Budberg’s diary (dnevnik), for example, is highly critical of the regime’s policies and 
programs, and even more cutting towards the military authorities, which he described as filled 
with “cretins” and “blind optimists.”
55
 Ultimately, the personal writings of those involved in the 
apparatus of the Omsk government shed light on internal differences and opinions within the 
White camp and present a more complex and multifaceted picture of the struggle that goes 
beyond the Western and Soviet myths. 
Unlike in the West, the conflict in Siberia was paid considerable attention by Soviet 
scholars, who attempted to demonstrate the soundness of Marxist theories of history by 
portraying Kolchak’s government as the ultimate symbol of reaction and the landowning classes’ 
futile attempt to preserve the old order.  Civil war veteran and historian Isaak Mints, who wrote 
the encyclopedic Istoriia grazhdanskoi voiny v SSSR and helped “lay the foundations for Stalinist 
historiography,” by placing Stalin, Voroshilov, and other contemporary Soviet heroes at the 
center of the conflict and denouncing any investigation that was not Stalinist.
56
 Other early 
Soviet works naturally focused on these ideological issues and the successes of the Red Army 
and underground communist resistance to Kolchak’s rule, .by the late Soviet period several 
authoritative accounts emerged that largely surpassed in quality many western accounts.
57
 
Genrikh Ioffe’s Kolchakovskaia aventiura stands apart from other Soviet works during this time, 
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and presents a relatively objective approach without the trappings of Marxist historical theory 
(despite discussions of Kolchak’s “Bonapartism”).
58
 As well, Iurii Zhurov’s work on the effect 
of the civil war on the Siberian countryside is a select example of a local study that utilizes 




The 1990’s in Russia saw a significant reevaluation of the events of the civil war and the 
anti-Bolshevik movement, which was partially in response to the need to create new Russian 
heroes and personalities that were separate from the Soviet past.
60
 Although many of the works 
from Russian academy in the 1990’s reflected the currents of nationalistic sentiment and the 
desire to rehabilitate figures in Russia’s past that were previously out-of-favor, they were the 
first to explore the resources that the newly opened archives held.  Additionally, they helped to 
shift the academic discussion of the civil war in Russia away from studies of the South and more 
towards the East and the role that Admiral Kolchak played in the conflict. 
The enthusiasm for reexamining the civil war in Siberia and the contributions of Admiral 
Kolchak have carried on strongly in Russia, and over the past 10 years several positivistic and 
theoretically advanced studies have helped reframe the parameters of discussion.  Pavel 
Zyrianov’s Admiral Kolchak, Verkhovnyi Pravitel’ Rossii places the Supreme Ruler as one of the 
central figures of the Russian Civil War, and utilizes extensive archival and unpublished sources 
to reconstruct Kolchak’s life without any common trappings of nationalism or patriotism.  
Zyrianov argues that Kolchak’s life experiences and personalities in large part determined the 
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fate of the Omsk government, which departs from the long-held notion that Kolchak was merely 
an observer of events.
61
 Another work by S.P. Zviagin investigates for the first time Kolchak’s 
law enforcement organs and other measures of political control, injecting an element of 
Foucaultian research that is largely absent on the topic as well as borrowing methodological tools 
from the study of the Bolsheviks.
62
 Finally, Vadim Zhuravlev work in the cultural sphere has 
injected new questions and concepts to a field that has largely been barren, and his work on the 
evolution of the title “Supreme Ruler” (Verkhovnyi Pravitel’) uses linguistic and sociological 
analysis to deconstruct its symbolic power and meaning.
63
 These works are outliers within the 
Russian historiography on the civil war in Siberia and represent true theoretical innovations that 
have no match in the western literature. 
 
This paper is about representation and construction, not efficacy and reception.  
Admittedly, without accurate circulation statistics or any real means of gauging the reception of 
these newspapers, the conclusions that can be drawn about White propaganda efforts in Siberia 
are limited at best.  The paper shortages that plagued all of Russia during the civil war, and along 
with the deteriorated state of printing industry and the ability to distribute papers meant that few 
people in the countryside ever saw any of the publications.
64
 Despite these restrictions, which 
could potentially be addressed by an in-depth study in the Russian archives, there is historical 
value in analyzing and deconstructing official propaganda as a means to illustrate how the 
regime viewed and presented itself and its claims to the mantle of power.  The articles and 
writings of the newspapers of Omsk demonstrate that White officials and writers actively 
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participated in the creation of a stylized representation of the movement through its leader 
Admiral Kolchak, even if the ultimate results of their efforts were ultimately unsuccessful when 
compared to the Bolsheviks' propaganda campaigns.  Instead of dismissing anti-Bolshevik 
propaganda as being ineffectual and amateurish, as some historians have suggested, we must 
take a closer look at the messages and symbols of the White regimes and situate them within the 
larger historical context of the development of mass media to communicate and articulate 
political messages and ideas.     
While the image of the Admiral Kolchak in daily newspapers is central to this project, the 
actions and ideological commitments of the men in the government, specifically the Kadet 
Eastern Section of the Central Committee (VOTsK), are of no secondary importance.  In order to 
fully understand the decision of the “mask makers” in Omsk to who shaped and deployed a 
stylized representation of the Supreme Ruler of All-Russia, it is necessary to explore why certain 
attributes and traits of the leader were chosen and highlighted through propaganda.  The 
ideological foundations of the Omsk regime were formed by the party’s experiences during the 
revolutions and the early days of civil war, the “product of a long and slow collective 
development.”
65
 The Kadets’ intellectual evolution from liberalism to support for military 
dictatorship was a dynamic process that reflected changing attitudes towards power and 
authority, which simultaneously reinforced and fundamentally altered the tenets of their political 
program.  By the time they assumed control of the government after the coup d’état of November 
18
th
, the Kadets had solidified their ideological commitments to the military and the rule of law 
and sought to reconstruct the image of Russia, including its new Supreme Ruler, in their 
idealized image of the modern state.     
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Setting the Stage 
 
Kadets in the Time of Troubles 
 The Constitutional Democratic Party was founded in October 1905 during the upheavals 
of revolution and disorder across the empire.  The party’s core constituency, made up mostly of 
nobles and members of the “professional intelligentsia,” and its founding members, including 
Pavel Miliukov and Prince Lvov, were committed to a liberal platform that included universal 
suffrage and the introduction of a democratically elected parliament.
66
 Although their ranks were 
filled mostly with members of Russia’s professional and intellectual elite, the Kadets claimed 
that they were committed to policies that were “above class” (nadklassnost’), and sought instead 
to serve the greater good of the Russian people and the state.
67
  The party’s first program, 
published in October 1905, which called for the guarantee of “fundamental civil liberties” and 
unflinching commitment to law and order, was seen by many in the Tsarist government 
(including members of the Octobrist Party) as being a “left-wing radical” document because it 
challenged the existing autocratic system.
68
  
 The outbreak of the First World War in 1914 had a profound and disruptive impact on the 
Kadets.  War with Germany helped crystallize and strengthen the nationalist and patriotic 
sentiments that had existed in the party since its founding, and party leaders urged all their 
followers to unite and support the preservation of Russia.  With an eye to expand the Duma’s and 
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their own role in state affairs, leaders like Miliukov forged alliances with other liberal groups and 
formed the “Progressive Bloc,” whose goal was to promote administrative reform without 
offering a direct challenge to the Tsar’s rule.
69
 The Kadets also strengthened their ties with 
liberal Moscow industrialists and entrepreneurs, like Pavel Riabushinskii and the Progressists, 
who were committed to winning the war and to reforming Russian society.
70
 
 However, despite the Progressive Bloc’s acquiescent nature and the limited reforms that 
were being proposed, the coalition failed to achieve any gains or influence from the Tsar, which 
led to a fracturing of party unity.  A split arose among the Kadets on whether to focus on limited 
political and administrative reforms, or to turn to the people and society in order to prepare for 
what Riabushinskii called in 1915, “…the complete seizure of executive and legislative 
power.”
71
 These growing divisions were further exacerbated by the string of military defeats at 
the front and social unrest in the cities which culminated in the overthrow of the Tsar after 
February Revolution in 1917.  The revolution placed the Kadets largely in control of the newly 
formed Russian Provisional Government, but despite their early positioning they were not able to 
build broad popular support at a time when mass politics and popular movements reigned 
supreme.
72
 This was most harshly reflected in the first democratic elections after the revolution, 
which saw the Kadets lose significant seats in local dumas and the Constituent Assembly to both 
moderate socialists and the SR’s.
73
 
 The difficulties of governance and administration during after the February Revolution 
were like an albatross hung from the neck of the Kadets: their liberal, reformist agenda had 
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proven to be ill-suited to the revolutionary mood of the country, and the stress of increasing 
social polarization that was occurring throughout the country contributed to widening gap 
between the party’s right and left wings.  The rise of Bolshevik involvement in local politics and 
the perceived mismanagement of the government and army by Kerensky and the socialists 
strengthened the hand of those on the right, who argued against any cooperation or conciliation 
with the socialists or the soviets.  In fact, after the tumultuous July Days and further questions of 
Kerensky’s ability to maintain law and order, the majority of the party moved further to the right 
and began open talks about a new form of government that would ensure stability and victory in 
the war: military dictatorship.
74
 
 The Kadets’ inclination towards and support for the army was deeply connected with 
their nationalistic and patriotic sentiments and their support for the Russian state.  Many Kadets 
(including Miliukov) saw the February Revolution as an opportunity to achieve military victory 
over the Germans, which they believed the Tsar had prevented due to his mismanagement of 
military affairs.
75
 In the minds of Kadet leaders, victory in the war was the only way to protect 
the gains and reforms of the revolution and to ensure the stability of law and order for the 
future.
76
 These attitudes led many, including Miliukov, to believe that the army would be the 
decisive actor in the conflict for political power and for the salvation of the Motherland (rodina).  
As Miliukov noted after the turmoil of the July Days, which saw the Kadet ministers and party 
members resign from the government, “it became clear that the final decision [regarding power] 
lay with the army, and not with the representative assemblies…”
77
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 The right wing of the party gained nearly full control after the Ninth Kadet Congress in 
late July 1917, where the party decided to commit themselves officially to combating “sectarian 
left-wing elements,” and to “dedicate all forces to saving the Motherland.”
78
 A “Military 
Commission” of the party was formed and tasked with agitation and promoting support for the 
Kadets among soldiers, officers, and Cossacks.  Continuing support and work with the army lead 
many to support General Lavr Kornilov and his plans for military dictatorship.  Although 
Miliukov and other leaders rejected the initial plan for dictatorship and refused to officially join 
Kornilov’s movement, many party officials helped with the organization of what would come to 
be known as the “Kornilov Affair.”
79
 
 The events of the Kornilov affair are well documented, and will not be discussed at-
length in this paper.  What is important for this investigation is the effect that the failed military 
“coup” had on the Kadet leaders, especially those among the party’s right wing.  The failure of 
the coup, and especially its lack of popular support, did not dissuade many in the Kadet ranks 
from supporting the idea of a military dictatorship.  Instead, Kerensky’s failure to crush the 
revolt and his reliance on the Red Guards to save the government convinced some that the need 
for strong military rule was more necessary than it had ever been.  When the Bolsheviks seized 
power in the October Revolution, these conservative Kadet leaders and politicians felt vindicated 
in their belief that the only salvation for Russia from the hands of left-wing radicals was a 
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 The October Revolution of 1917 and the subsequent collapse of the Provisional 
Government decisively ended the Kadets’ and other liberals attempt to govern post-Tsarist 
Russia.  Although members of the Central Committee briefly attempted to use the “legitimate” 
institutions of government that remained to rally people against Lenin and the Bolsheviks, it was 
clear that the party of the “professional intelligentsia” did not command any popular support 
from the narod, and more importantly, could not bring to bear any bayonets (shtyki) for their 
cause.  In the days and months following the revolution, the Kadets began to disintegrate and 
fracture along ideological lines, as the party had no clear or coherent plan or response to the 
Bolshevik seizure of power.
81
  
Thus, party members were faced with a series of difficult choices of where and how to 
begin an open anti-Bolshevik struggle.  Some, like Miliukov, favored working with the Germans 
to drive the Bolsheviks out of Russia; others, like Nikolai Astrov and Vasilii Stepanov, headed 
south to build a connection with the newly organized anti-Bolshevik forces in the Don and the 
Kuban.  The Volunteer Army, which was initially formed as an underground officers 
organization by General Mikhail Alekseev, had attracted thousands of former officers (and some 
soldiers) from all across Russia, under the banner of fighting Bolshevism.
82
  Relations between 
the Kadets and the Volunteer Army were tense at first, especially due to the arrival of Kornilov, 
who detested politics and blamed the failure of his coup in large part on their political 
weakness.
83
  With the sudden death of Kornilov and the passing of Alekseev, command of the 
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Volunteer Army fell to Anton Denikin, who was fully open to cooperation with the Kadets and 
helped make them the leaders of the government he was to establish later in 1918.
84
 
 While many of the Party’s prominent leaders travelled to the South to meet with the 
Volunteer Army, others party functionaries departed for the East, which was rapidly becoming a 
hotbed for anti-Bolshevik activity.  After the revolt of the Czechoslovak Legion along the Trans-
Siberian Railroad in May 1918, local anti-Bolshevik governments began to emerge in the major 
cities now outside of the Bolsheviks’ control.  One of these was the SR dominated Committee of 
Members of the Constituent Assembly (Komuch), which was headquartered in Samara, and 
which enacted socialist policies and drew its legitimacy from the seemingly defunct Constituent 
Assembly.
85
 As a counterbalance to the left-oriented Komuch, the Provisional Siberian 
Government (PSG) in Omsk, founded in January 1918, struck a strongly regionalist and 
conservative tone and quickly rescinded all of the programs the Bolsheviks had initiated, 
including returning land and property to their owners.
86
 
 Along with the Komuch and PSG governments, there were smaller administrations 
throughout Siberia that claimed legitimacy, such as the Western Siberian Commissariat in 
Tomsk and the Regional Siberian Duma in Omsk.  Although the ability of these governments to 
effectively administrate their own territories was in serious question, the Kadet Central 
Committee in Moscow was interested in sending its representatives to meet with these bodies in 
order to increase Kadet influence and to press for the unification of the anti-Bolshevik front.  The 
Kadet Party had little organization in Siberia, and many of the more conservative circles of 
Siberian politics were staunchly regionalist, and therefore hesitant to embrace a national 
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program.  Many of the Kadets who went East were also members of the Union for the 
Regeneration of Russia, which was a non-party organization established with the expressed task 
of “…the resurrection of Russian state authority, the reunion with Russia of the regions 
forcefully cut off from her, and the defense of these regions from foreign enemies.”
87
 The Union 
of Regeneration’s platform was specifically ambiguous in regards to what form this “state 
authority” would take, and this lack of clarity would be exploited by certain Kadets to promote 
the idea of military dictatorship.
88
 
 Of the Kadets who left Moscow to help establish a new anti-Bolshevik government in 
Siberia, perhaps the most influential and nationally recognizable was Viktor N. Pepeliaev.  As a 
former Kadet party organizer in Tomsk, Pepeliaev gained national prominence through his party 
work in Kronstadt and his unflinching support of General Kornilov.  He was also a member of 
the Union of Regeneration, and part of his mission in Siberia was to propagandize and spread 
both the Kadets’ and Union’s anti-Bolshevik message.  Pepeliaev was ostensibly sent by the 
Central Committee of the Kadets to form a coalition among the moderate socialists and liberals 
in the Komuch government in Samara and the Provisional Siberian Government in Omsk.  
However, Pepeliaev was not interested in compromising or even working with socialists of any 
sort, and instead travelled through Siberian gathering supporters for military dictatorship.  As 
Jonathan Smele has argued, Pepeliaev was actively promoting the program of the right-wing 
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 Pepeliaev found support for military dictatorship among many Siberian politicians 
(Kadets and non-Kadets alike), especially those who were members of the PSG in Omsk.  
Although many of the party members in the East were committed to the idea of regionalism and 
some degree of Siberian autonomy, Pepeliaev’s call for national unity under single-person rule 
gained traction even among the regionalists.  One of Pepeliaev’s earliest supporters and 
confidants was the Kadet lawyer Valentin Zhardetskii, who was well known in Omsk as a 
conservative and strong supporter of military rule.  As early as July 1918 at a party conference in 
Omsk, Zhardetskii was quoted in a local newspaper as saying that “….now that the passions of 
civil war have boiled, there must inevitably be established a strong, one-man authority, with the 
capability of saving the state.
90
 
 In addition to Zhardetskii, Pepeliaev established contacts with local right-leaning 
Siberian Kadets who would go on to occupy some of the most important positions in Admiral 
Kolchak’s government.  Pepeliaev met with the Tomsk lawyer Georgii Tel’berg and another 
Kadet transplant from St. Petersburg, Nikoali V. Ustrialov, who would go on to be Kolchak’s 
administrative secretary and head of the information bureau, respectively.
91
  Pepeliaev also 
established contact with the mysterious yet powerful young economist Ivan A. Mikhailov, who 
served on the council of ministers of the PSG.  Mikhailov, whose background was shrouded in as 
much mystery and confusion as his rapid rise to power, was formerly a socialist but had shifted 
to the right when it became clear that the only force with true power in Siberia was the army.
92
  
Mikhailov would go on to play a crucial (and ill-fated) role as Kolchak’s Minister of Finance. 
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 As Pepeliaev travelled farther East, he began to make contacts with different military and 
civilian leaders to float the idea of a military dictatorship in Siberia.  For months, legions of 
former Tsarist officers began to collect and congregate in Omsk, where they believed they had 
the best chance to influence the creation of a new government.  A chance encounter on a train in 
Manchuria with the young Czech general Radola Gajda would further cement Pepeliaev’s plans 
and finally put them into action.  Gajda, who had risen through the ranks of the Czech legion and 
proved himself to be a staunch fighter against the Bolsheviks in the Transbaikal, was also in 
agreement that a change of government was necessary.
93
  Gajda concurred with Pepeliaev’s 
statement that, “…salvation lies in the person of a military dictator who must create an army.”
94
 
The next task for Pepeliaev and the Kadets in Siberia was to find a person suitable to fill the 
idealized role of dictator. 
 The initial candidate for many Kadets and officers was General Dmitrii Khorvat, who 
controlled the Chinese Eastern Railway from his headquarters in Kharbin, and was “a reactionary 
monarchist who the considered the revolution a national catastrophe…”
95
 Khorvat was a former 
administrator in the Provisional Government who conducted his affairs from a railroad car.  As 
political infighting consumed other anti-Bolshevik movements to the west, on July 9
th
, 1918, 
Khorvat declared himself to be the “Provisional Ruler” of Russia, as “the sole remaining 
representative of the Provisional Government.”
96
  However, the territory Khorvat ruled over did 
not extend far outside of his own railroad car: the Soviets still controlled large swathes of the 
Transbaikal, and he was effectively cut off from Omsk and even from the recently captured 
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Vladivostock.  More importantly, Khorvat lacked any sort of military power and did not have an 
effective fighting force under his command.  With the daily arrival of conservative politicians 
and officers in Siberia in the summer of 1918, the Kadet leadership began to look towards a 
figure with a greater national reputation and with military credentials.
97
 
 On July 13
th
, 1918, amidst internal political conflicts in the PSG, Mikhailov founded the 
Omsk Political Bloc, which included “…delegates of the Trade-Industry Congress, Kadets, Right 
Socialist-Revolutionaries, and cooperative organizers…”
98
 On the surface, the purpose of the 
organization was to block regionalist propositions from Siberian autonomists within the PSG; in 
reality, however, the group, with the Mikhailov and the Kadets as the leadership core, began 
preparations for a coup that would establish a military dictatorship.  The bloc’s members also 
began to form strong ties with groups of officers in Omsk, including the secret military 
organization established by Col. V.I. Volkov.
99
  The creation of the Omsk Bloc was significant 
because it signaled the formal alliance between the social and political groups that would come 
to dominate Kolchak’s administration (with the exception of the SR’s.) 
 
The Arrival of Kolchak 
 Throughout the summer and fall months of 1918, the Kadets and their new constituents 
began to concentrate power and begin preparations for the establishment of a dictatorship.  The 
arrival in September of Vice-Admiral Aleksandr Vasilevich Kolchak provided an ideal candidate 
for the position of military dictator, despite the fact that the government’s seat in Omsk was 
thousands of kilometers from the ocean.  Kolchak arrived in Siberia via the United States and 
Japan, and was escorted along the trans-Siberian railroad by General Alfred Knox, the British 
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military attaché to the Russian army.
100
  While there is considerable debate as to what level Knox 




 it is clear that Kolchak 
was aware that a military dictatorship was being planned, and that his name had been mentioned 
as a possible candidate.
102
 
 In many ways, Kolchak was the ideal choice to be at the head of the new military 
dictatorship, especially for men like Pepeliaev, who had been laying the grounds for uni-personal 
rule for months.  Kolchak was a distinguished war hero, and his exploits in the Baltic and Black 
Sea Fleets shone brightly amidst the dreadful performance of Russia’s army.  He was deeply 
patriotic, and had actually attempted to join the English navy in Mesopotamia in order to fulfill 
his obligation to fight the Germans.  He enjoyed a strong reputation among right-wing circles in 
revolutionary Russia, and there were even rumors of his participation in counter-revolutionary 
conspiratorial organizations in St. Petersburg after the February Revolution.
103
  Most 
importantly, however, was that he was a military man, and for many Kadets he embodied the 
values and ideals that they believed were necessary for the salvation of Russia.
104
 
 The admiral also possessed qualities that were desirable to the power hungry groups of 
Kadets and officers in Omsk.  In the words of G.K. Guins, a Kadet and important confidant of 
Kolchak when he was in power: 
The admiral was a politically naïve man.  He did not understand the complexities of political 
organizations, the roles of political parties, or the games of ambition as factors of governing.  The 
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Hailing from a purely military background, he had had no experience whatsoever with politics, 
parties, and backroom dealings; in Smele’s words, he was totally “…without political guile.”
106
  
He considered the military to above politics in all facets, and detested the constant debates and 
bickering that were associated with democratic politics.
107
 With this in mind, the Kadets who 
were making plans believed (rightfully so) that they would have a freehand in administration and 
governance if Kolchak were chosen as dictator.   
 With the arrival of Kolchak and the consolidation of political and military groups in 
Omsk, Pepeliaev and the Kadets vigorously argued for the dissolution of the new “legitimate” 
anti-Bolshevik government in the East, the Directory (also known was the All-Russian 
Provisional Government (ARPG).  The Directory, which was established as a compromise at the 
Ufa State Conference in September between the delegates from Komuch and the PSG, was 
declared to be Russia’s “legitimate authority” with powers of temporary rule until the eventual 
reconvening of the Constituent Assembly.  Both right and left elements present at the conference 
were dissatisfied with the compromise and the Directory, and the decision to move operations to 





The Coup D’état of November 18th 
 In early November the Directory, whose members included two SRs (Nikoali Avksentiev 
and Vladimir Zenzinov), a Siberian regionalist (Petr Vologodskii), a Kadet lawyer (Vladimir A. 
Vionogradov), and a left-leaning general (Vasili Boldyrev), appointed Kolchak as Minister of 
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War and the Navy.
109
  By this time, the political atmosphere in Omsk had been inundated with 
rumors about a right-wing coup and the establishment of a military dictatorship.  Although there 
had been rumors speculating about the demise of the Directory at the hands of the officers since 
its inception, the arrival of Kolchak in Omsk accelerated their circulation.
110
  Members of the 
Directory, including General Boldyrev, were aware of the growing speculation: “The idea of a 
dictatorship grows stronger and stronger in political and military circles.  I have hints from 
different sides.  Now this idea will probably be connected with Kolchak.”
111
 The rumors indeed 
proved to be true, and the conspirators would not take long to realize their goal of the creation of 
a military dictatorship.  Although historians have debated who exactly participated in the coup 
d’état and to what extent, it is clear that the two central figures were the Kadet Viktor Pepeliaev 
and Ivan Mikhailov, with strong support from the Cossacks and military staff officers.  There has 
been much speculation that the British government, through their representative in Omsk, 
General Alfred Knox, was supportive if not directly involved in the preparations for the coup, 
although no conclusive evidence has yet come to light.
112
  
 The details of the coup of November 18
th
 have been written about at length by a 
multitude of both Western and Soviet historians, but given the focus of this paper, a concise 
summary of the events will be provided.  In the late hours of the night on November 18, 1918, 
Cossack units arrived at the house of a well-known SR and arrested the party members there, 
including two members of the Directory, Zenzinov and Avksentiev.  As news of the arrest spread 
through the political circles of Omsk, Vologodskii called an extraordinary meeting of the 
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Council of Ministers and staff officers to decide the future course of action.  Despite the 
ostensible commitment to debate and discussion, most of those at meeting had already come to 
the conclusion that a military dictatorship was the ideal replacement for the now-defunct 
Directory (if they had not directly participated in the coup).
113
 The decision to be made was then 
not the form of the new government, but rather who would be empowered as the new “Supreme 
Ruler” (Verkhonvyi Pravitel’) of All-Russia.  Of the three main “candidates” for discussion 
(Kolchak, Khorvat, and Boldyrev), only Kolchak was present, and he spoke in front of the 
Council members in support of military dictatorship, although he favored Boldyrev, who was a 
high ranking officer in the old Imperial Army.
114
 
 After a brief period of debate and discussion, Kolchak left the room while the rest of 
those present discussed his candidacy.  Nearly all those present, including the staff officers of the 
Siberian Army and most of the Council members, had agreed that Kolchak was best suited for 
the position, and Mikhailov called for a vote to be taken.  There is some debate as to how many 
polls were taken, but in the final version Kolchak received ten votes and Boldyrev one.
115
  Thus, 
without a drop of blood being shed, the Directory (and with it, the “democratic 
counterrevolution”) had been overthrown and a new military dictatorship established.  The 
Kadets in Siberia, and especially those members of the VOTsK, had realized their long-held 
ambition to abandon the trappings of political parties and compromise and to vest all power in 
the military and unipersonal authority.  Of course, the realities of the administration of the new 
government, along with the Admiral’s well-known “political naïveté,” ensured the Kadets would 
have strong, if not total, control of the shaping of the ideology and policy of the new regime.  In 
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Siberia the Party came to be known informally as “the Party of November 18
th
,” and the Kadet 
publicist and Chairman of the VOTsK Aleksandr K. Klfaton proudly proclaimed in the Party’s 
paper, Sibirskaya Rech’: “…we became the party of the coup d’etat.  We took upon ourselves 




 The installation of a military dictatorship, with Admiral Aleksandr Kolchak at its head, 
signaled a dramatic shift in the form and the identity of the anti-Bolshevik struggle in the East, 
and throughout Russia.  Those behind the coup in Omsk had irrevocably ended the often-tense 
alliance between left and right anti-Bolshevik parties, and dispensed with the slogans calling for 
wider participation and the convocation of the Constituent Assembly.  In accordance with the 
right-leaning and military identity of the new regime, new symbols needed to be created to 
cement its legitimacy and to appeal to the diverse masses of the Russian population that were 
now under its control.  The key role played by symbols and languages from both sides during the 
revolutionary and civil war periods provided the necessity to master and deploy images, writings, 
and slogans in order to cement power; as Figes and Kolonitskii write, this period “…can be 
viewed as a struggle between competing symbolic systems, each attempting to mobilize and 
unite its followers behind its own symbols of identity.”
117
 Despite the well-tread arguments about 
the anti-Bolshevik movement’s inability to master ideas and symbols,
118
 the following chapter 
will demonstrate that at the very least that the Whites in the East understood the power of 
ideology and propaganda, and they attempted to create their own myths and images to serve their 
cause in the struggle against Bolshevism.  
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Kolchak the Military Man 
 
“As the Supreme Ruler, I am simply a soldier-guard and it is my duty, like any honest citizen, to protect the precious 




Kolchak Takes the Stage 
Immediately following the vote to elect Kolchak to the position of Supreme Ruler of 
Russia after the coup d’état of November 18
th
, 1918, the men who met at the offices of the 
Council of Ministers were faced with the crucial task of presenting the new leader of the anti-
Bolshevik movement in the East to its own citizens and to those following the conflict around the 
world.  The military staff members, former ministers of the Provisional Siberian Government, 
members of the Directory, and Kadet politicians who were present at this “extraordinary session” 
had decisively acted to concentrate all power and authority within the figure of one man.
120
 
Despite their diverse backgrounds, those in attendance had decided that the rule of a strong, 
authoritarian figure was necessary to triumph in the armed conflict over the Bolsheviks, and to 
unite all the people of Russia under a common banner.   
With this centralization of power, there was also a need to centralize the representation 
and perception of the new regime, for both domestic and international consumption.  As seen 
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with the Kerensky phenomenon after the February revolution, politics and power during this time 
hinged on the project of an image of a strong and powerful ruler who could unite the disparate 
parties and factions and finally bring stability to the chaotic circumstances that Russia faced.  As 
Miliukov had noted in the days after the February Revolution, the construction of a new order 
required a strong power with symbols that were familiar to the people.
121
  Of no less importance 
was providing the allies with a stable and legitimate government to support, as they became 
increasingly interested in intervening to stop the spread of Bolshevism and Soviet power. 
Thus, there was an impetus to transform the image of the new leader into what Harold D. 
Lasswell referred to as a “key symbol” of the new Omsk government.
122
 According to Guins, 
“He was a symbol of that idea [the abstract ideas of the Kadets], he burned its flame and he died 
for it.”
123
  Kolchak would become a synecdoche for the White movement in the East, and 
eventually for the anti-Bolshevik movements in Southern and Northern Russia, under Denikin 
and Yudenich, respectively.  Contemporary sources wrote that it would be “Admiral Kolchak 
who will create a new Russia.”
124
 More importantly, as a “key symbol,” the image of the 
Supreme Ruler that was disseminated embodied fully the goals, principles, and aspirations of 
those who fashioned it: the Kadet members of the Omsk government (or rather, the 
“costumiers”).  Above all, it was these “mask makers” who, through the use of the press and 
mass media, were responsible for the creation of an idealized representation of Kolchak that 
symbolized the Kadets’ support for military dictatorship and their vision for the future of Russia.  
Within the organs of government, which were controlled almost exclusively by members 
of the Kadets’ Eastern Central Committee, Viktor N. Pepeliaev and Nikolai V. Ustrialov exerted 
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the strongest influence on the construction of the image of the Supreme Ruler.  Pepeliaev, a 
Kadet party organizer with some limited national recognition, was a strong proponent of military 
dictatorship and had been the chief engineer of the coup d’etat of November 18
th
.  Although he 
was ostensibly the Minister of Internal Affairs and chief of Kolchak’s police (militsia), Pepeliaev 
wielded wide-ranging powers and influence within the Omsk government, especially in matters 
concerning political philosophy and ideology.
125
  Ustrialov, a rightist Kadet lawyer who had long 
advocated for unipersonal military rule, was designated as the Minister of Information and Chief 
of the Russian Press Bureau, along with holding the position of Kolchak’s administrative 
secretary.
126
 Ustrialov perhaps exercised the most direct influence on the creation of the image of 
the Supreme Ruler due to his control of the press apparatus (a power that grew steadily over 
time), and he utilized the newspapers of Omsk and other White territories to lay the foundations 
of a stylized representation of Admiral Kolchak to appeal to the entire population of Russia. 
Valentin A. Zhardetskii, a Siberian lawyer and editor of the Kadet newspaper Sibirskaia 
Rech’, would also play a crucial role in the development of a military image of the Supreme 
Ruler.  Zhardetskii was a prolific writer and frequently published editorials and articles in many 
major newspapers of the Omsk government, where he espoused the strength and righteousness of 
Admiral Kolchak’s military dictatorship.  Georg K. Guins (the Deputy Minister of Foreign 
Affairs) described him as one of the chief ideologues of the regime, and wrote that Zhardetskii 
was “a fanatic of military dictatorship and of Great Russia.” He was one of the Admiral’s 
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staunchest supporters (a “troubadour” of the regime), although Guins noted that his abstract 
thinking prevented him from becoming a “real politician.”
127
 
In addition to Zhardetskii, other right-leaning Siberian Kadets who occupied some of the 
most important positions in the Council of Ministers contributed to the creation of a military 
identity for Kolchak and the Omsk government.  Tomsk lawyer Georgii Tel’berg, the Minister of 
Justice and Chief Administrator of the Council of Ministers, was responsible for coordinating 
press interviews for Kolchak, and for giving speeches on his behalf.
128
  There was also the 
powerful Ivan A. Mikhailov, who served as Kolchak’s Minister of Finance.  Although as an 
economist he did not exercise any direct control over the ideological or propaganda wings of the 
government, he was still one of the most powerful figures in the Omsk administration, and was 
head of the “Mikhailov Group” of the Council of Ministers, which held secret meetings to 
determine and create policy.
129
  It was this group of Kadets, who held the most prominent and 
authoritative positions in the Omsk government, that were the “mask makers” who created the 
image of the Supreme Ruler as a military ruler, a leader who fully embodied their belief in 
military dictatorship as the only route to salvation for Russia. 
The task of quickly and adequately presenting the new Supreme Leader to the 
populations now under his control was made more pressing and difficult by the fact that Kolchak 
himself enjoyed little popularity among average citizens, despite his distinguished war record 
and notoriety as an arctic explorer.  In large part this was due to his lack of participation in any 
of the previous revolutionary events, and also the fact that he was an admiral that was thousands 
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of kilometers from the sea in an area without a rich naval tradition.
130
  More importantly, since 
his position was now the head of a military dictatorship, it was necessary to create a clear and 
inspiring image of power for the soldiers in the army.  As Kolchak himself noted during his 
testimony, “Authority must first of all be backed by widespread popularity and confidence 




On the morning of November 18
th
, the first proclamation of the new Supreme Ruler was 
hastily posted on buildings and public meeting places around Omsk, and over the next few days 
it was printed in nearly every newspaper in the regions controlled by the former Directory. In 
addition to the major papers in the region and the usual news organs of the Provisional Siberian 
Government, this proclamation was printed in a variety of specialized and local papers that the 
new government would eventually be at odds with and shut down, such as the paper of Siberian 
worker’s cooperatives (artelei) and other cooperatives, Narodnaia Gazeta.
132
   
On November 18
th
 1918 the All-Russian Government collapsed.  The Council of 
Ministers took all power into its hands and then transferred it to me – Admiral of the Russian 
Fleet, Aleksandr Kolchak.  Having taken up the heavy cross of power in the exceptionally 
difficult conditions of civil war and the complete disruption of the life of the state, I declare: I 
will follow neither the path or reaction nor the fatal path of party politics.  I set as my chief aims 
the creation of a battle worthy army, victory over Bolshevism and the establishment of law and 
order, so that the people may freely choose for themselves the form of government that they 
wish and realize the great freedoms which are being advanced around the entire world.  I 




The first proclamation created by the new Supreme Ruler and the Omsk government 
employed simple and direct language with a clear message.  Although it is questionable whether 
Kolchak wrote the document himself, it was signed by him and directly addressed to all the 
people under his rule.  In the first line, the fall of the previous government is mentioned and the 
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transfer of power from the government to the new legitimate authority is introduced.  Kolchak’s 
full military rank in the old Tsarist navy is provided in order to fully establish his military 
credentials and to demonstrate that the old military chain of command had been followed and the 
highest-ranking officer was chosen to lead, which was necessary in order to ensure the coup’s 
legitimacy.
134
  He firmly declares that he is neither a reactionary nor a politician, and thus 
attempts to nullify the popular reactionary perceptions of the anti-Bolshevik movement and the 
instability of party politics.  Mentioning “the heavy cross of power” clearly indicates that he is 
not an “adventurer” or a “demagogue” bent on increasing his own power, but rather, a Russian 
incarnation of Cincinnatus, who was given absolute power by the Senate in a time of crisis.
135
 
After concerns over the nature and intentions of the new government that came to power 
after the coup were addressed, the main goals of the Supreme Ruler are explicitly stated: “I set as 
my chief aims the creation of a battle worthy army, victory over Bolshevism and the 
establishment of law and order…” While the matter of establishing law and order will be 
addressed in the next chapter, for the purposes of this discussion Kolchak’s “chief aim” here is 
significant and telling.  The “creation” of an effective army and triumph over Bolshevism on the 
battlefield clearly indicates to the reader that the Supreme Ruler is first and foremost a military 
man with military objectives.  The fact that the strengthening of the army is mentioned before the 
creation of a new type of “democratic” government demonstrates that the new regime’s raison 
d’état is of a military nature.  The proclamation also avoids any direct reference to major social 
or political issues, including the controversial land question, and omits a clearly defined concept 
or vision of the future of Russia.  While some have suggested that the vagueness of the message 
was intended to avoid upsetting the potentially unstable coalition of the new government, it is 
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clear that the Supreme Ruler’s first message to the population was intended to communicate that 
Admiral Kolchak was first and foremost a military man whose objective was the defeat of the 
Bolsheviks on the battlefield.
136
 
After the first address was posted (and as the government increasingly asserted its control 
and censorship of newspapers), all subsequent mentions and discussions of the Supreme Ruler 
would focus on and reproduce the language used in the proclamation.
137
  “Military,” “army,” 
“law and order,” and “unity” would become key terms or slogans for mobilization, and which 
were all identified with the image of Admiral Kolchak.  However, in the early months of the 
Omsk government, the “military” discourse superseded all others; as Kolchak noted in an early-
published address, “Only in the Army, only in the armed forces is there salvation.  Everything 
else must be subordinated to its interests, to its tasks.”
138
  
These military “tasks” were further elucidated in an article in the government’s (both 
current and the former PSG’s) official organ, Pravitel’stvennyi Vestnik, on November 28
th
.  In 
the editorial, Kolchak announced the reformation and creation of a new army from the remnants 




The current situation forces myself and my advisors to concentrate all of our attentions upon the 
establishment of a powerful, battle worthy Army.  This is our chief task.  Without an Army it is impossible 




Although the language and “chief task,” were the same as in the first declaration, Kolchak’s 
writing in Pravitel’stvennyi Vestnik concretely signaled the creation of the “Russian Army.”  The 
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choice of this name was an attempt to bestow legitimacy on the army and the government, which 
claimed to be Russia’s true representative government.  It was also an attempt to distance the 
military and the regime from the previous SR-dominated Komuch and Directory armies from 





As the new government began to consolidate its power and expand its operation, new 
propaganda efforts were undertaken that were specifically aimed at the soldiers and officers of 
the newly dubbed “Russian Army.”  Despite the rampant paper shortages that affected the whole 
country, several new newspapers were founded and distributed exclusively within the army.  The 
papers, including Golos Armii, Russkii Voin, Russkaia Armiia, and Golos Sibirskoi Armii, were 
distributed among the rank and file and focused on topics and stories relating to army life and the 
war.  They also served as a vehicle for the creation and dissemination of the image of the 
Supreme Ruler, who was also the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of all Russian Armies.  In the 
military newspapers (and some others), Kolchak was always referred to with both of these titles 
(Verkhovnyi Pravitel’ i Verkhovnyi Glavnokomanduiushchii) when issuing orders (prikazy).
142
 
One of the newspapers, Russkii Voin, was introduced in mid-January 1919, about two 
months after the successful coup d’état.  The paper, targeted at soldiers and officers, was 
advertised as a “Military, Social, and Scientific-Literary Newspaper,” with the motto, “A 
Powerful and Battle worthy Army- the Pillar and the Power of Great Russia.”
143
 In addition to 
displaying official orders and commands from the stavka, articles were printed that included 
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discussions on the life of a soldier, brief and amusing short stories, and tales of Bolshevik cruelty 
and crimes.  Soldiers (especially those Siberian peasants that were drafted into Kolchak’s ranks) 
had little previous experience in the political world before the revolution, and thus were seen by 
leaders on both sides as a key constituency to reach through propaganda and “political 
enlightenment.”
144
 Military service and victories of the army the most effective forms of 
propaganda; as a prominent general noted, victories would mean “the entire people would come 
over to our side and stand openly beneath the Admiral’s banner.”
145
 
Russkii Voin also served to popularize and propagate the image of Admiral Kolchak as 
not only the Supreme Commander-in-chief of the military, but also as a brave and dedicated war 
hero.  In the second issue of the paper a new song with lyrics about Admiral Kolchak was 
introduced, that was to be set to the tune of the popular marching anthem, “Rise, Falcons, 
Eagles:” 
The masts hover above the waves, 
A proud Russian flag sweeps 
That goes to battle with the enemy. 
Glorious Admiral Kolchak. 
 
Waves of foam and splashing, 
All the silence, the darkness is everywhere, 
Only the gun menacingly shine: 
Watch out, cunning enemy. 
 
Suddenly a shot rang out in the distance, 
And the terrible howling shell. 
Our fleet adjusted quickly 
And took the fight to the Germans. 
 
And on the bridge, severe, 
With a sharp eye that cuts the darkness, 
ready to die for Russia, 
Glorious Admiral Kolchak. 
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Shells bursting with a roar 
And the smoke of the fire shines, 
But a worthy reward- 
God keeps the Admiral. 
 
The German fleet retreats, 
Enemy ships Perish 
And the dead are covered, 
Smashed on a wave. 
 
Again menacingly above the waves, 
Sweeps a proud Russian flag... 





 Traditional songs were an important part of Russian popular culture, and they assumed 
both political and revolutionary functions during and after the upheavals of February and 
October.  As Figes and Kolonitskii note, “Songs united…giving cohesion and a collective 
identity to diverse groups and classes.”
147
 While the “Marseillaise” and the “Internationale” were 
anthems of the revolutionary cause, Tsarist marching songs such as “Rise, Falcons, Eagles,” 
signaled opposition to any revolutionary movement.  The lyrics chronicle Kolchak’s past as a 
naval commander during the First World War, and highlights his accomplishments in crushing 
the enemy, the Germans.  While establishing Kolchak’s past credentials as a war hero, the song 
also conveys the message of how Kolchak would deal with the immediate enemy (vrag), the 
Bolsheviks.  The image of Kolchak on the bridge, “severe, with a sharp eye that cuts the 
darkness,” metaphorically harkens to Kolchak’s position at the head of the army and the 
government, steering the ship amidst the fires and waves of civil war.  While it is unclear how 
many (if any) soldiers or officers sang the words to “Admiral’ Kolchak,’” the lyrics are meant to 
convey an unambiguous representation of a “glorious” Kolchak as a military man who would 
ruthlessly crush any enemies he faced. 
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 Along with articles in newspapers and the appropriation of Tsarist marching songs, the 
stavka named the 25
th
 regiment of the 7
th
 Ural Division the “Admiral Kolchak Regiment.”  While 
naming regiments and divisions after great military leaders was a common practice in the 
Russian military, as White memoirist V.M. Molchanov noted it was quite unusual to name a unit 
after a person who was still living.
148
  The regiment, since it bore the name of the Supreme 
Ruler, was allocated the assignments (often at the expense of better positioned regiments) that 
would yield the most glory and significance, such as the capture of Ufa in early March of 
1919.
149
  When the 25
th
 regiment marched triumphantly through the streets of “liberated” Ufa, 
the glory was inescapably linked to Admiral Kolchak.  
 Not content with limiting the spread of their message to the territories directly under 
White control, the Omsk propaganda and intelligence bureau Osved (Osvedomitel’nyi otdel), and 
its various regional and departmental variations, sought to use propaganda and agitation to 
weaken the ranks of the Red Army.
150
 The Russian Press Bureau also put the Supreme Ruler in 
direct communication with the soldiers of the Red Army, through a widely circulated address 
that encouraged them to desert and join the ranks of the anti-Bolshevik struggle.  In an appeal to 
the “officers and soldiers of the Red Army,” to those who “proved their love for their 
Motherland on the fields of Prussia and Galicia,” Kolchak urges them to “…come East, where 
now is being fought the war for Russia’s salvation – from cold Siberia where tyranny does not 
reign, but law.”
151
 He further repeats his famous order that all officers and soldiers of the Red 
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Army who cross over to the Whites will be “welcomed with joy, as unfortunate brothers.”
152
 
Although given the strict punishments in place in Kolchak’s Siberia for any level of cooperation 
with the Bolsheviks, along with the alleged cruelty of the officers and the “White Terror,” meant 
that probably very few headed the Admiral’s call, it is still significant that an appeal was even 





In addition to targeting their message to rank and file soldiers, the newspapers also 
attempted to appeal to one of the Omsk government’s strongest constituencies, the officers.  
Over the previous months former Tsarist officers from all over Russia had begun to collect in 
Omsk, with estimates of the size of their presence in the city ranging in the thousands.
154
 Unlike 
those who joined the Volunteer Army in the South, many of these officers were not interested in 
actively participating in the war; rather, they sought administrative and staff jobs throughout the 
city, which led to a rise in bloated and inefficient military staffs and social unrest.
155
 Regardless 
of their effect on Omsk’s political and social stability, the officers in the rear were a large 
constituency of the Kolchak government, and many sections of newspapers (both civilian and 
military) were directed towards them. 
Throughout the newspapers of Omsk and the rest of the White territories, a veritable “cult 
of the officer” was deliberately created and developed by those in power.  While the officers did 
have an outsized presence in Omsk and wielded considerable influence on the government, this 
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veneration was intrinsically linked to Admiral Kolchak and his position as Supreme 
Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army.  The rigid and inflexible chain of command 
(subordinatsiia), a feature of the former imperial army that occupied a central position in the 
Russian Army, meant total reverence for, and subordination to, superior officers.
156
 As the 
highest-ranking officer in Russia, any celebration of the officer and “officer culture” contained 
implicit acknowledgement and admiration for Kolchak.  Officers would often send telegrams 
thanking Kolchak for his service and leadership, and he reciprocated by ordering the population 
to “treat each officer-defender with gratitude.”
157
 
The beginnings of the veneration and celebration of officers and their culture stemmed 
from the Omsk leader’s reverence of the original members of the Volunteer Army.  The armed 
insurrection in the South that was begun by Generals Alekseev and Kornilov was presented as 
the true beginning of the struggle for the salvation of Russia, and their exploits were nothing less 
than legendary.  The paper, Golos Armii, (irregularly) printed a column entitled “From the 
Annals of the Volunteer Army,” which gave detailed accounts of the celebrated “Ice March” and 
the “March Back to the Don.”
158
 The myth of the Volunteer Army was so powerful that Guins 
speculated that it was the sole reason for the appointment of the inexperienced D.A. Lebedev to 
Chief of Staff of the Russian Army.  Lebedev, who is universally reviled and blamed for the 
army’s defeat in émigré memoirs, had come from the South with a minor command in the 
Volunteer Army, and was said by Kolchak to embody “the spirit of Kornilov.”
159
 A short story in 
the paper Russkoe Delo, entitled “The Way of the Officer,” vividly chronicled the travels of a 
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“brave” and “patriotic” captain and his loyal detachment through the First World War and their 
arrival in Don to fight the Bolsheviks.
160
  The same paper also carried а weekly printing of the 
notes and diary of “the Greatest Russian Patriot” (Velichaishii Russkii Patriot) General Kornilov.  
The notes included the day-by-day affairs of the army and his views on Russia’s salvation from 
Bolshevik rule.  Kornilov’s title, “Supreme Commander-in-Chief” was bolded in the 




As popular as the “cult of Kornilov” was among officers and right-wing supporters,
162
 the 
newspapers of Omsk dedicated significant attention and articles to General Alekseev, “The First 
Russian Volunteer.”
163
 In Nasha Gazeta and other papers, portraits that took up nearly half the 
front page were displayed on the anniversary of Alekseev’s death, with his general’s cap and St. 
George’s Cross displayed prominently.
164
 The next day’s paper featured a quote from Alekseev 
that was clearly associated with the deteriorating situation in Omsk in October 1919: “I have 
only a few people, but a lot of faith in Russia.  We cannot perish.”
165
 Alekseev proved to be a 
better candidate than Denikin for veneration in the Omsk newspapers, since he was not alive and 
therefore unable to compete with the Supreme Ruler for power and recognition.  While it 
remains unclear if there was any true animosity between Kolchak and Denikin, it is clear that 
some level of competition existed, at the very least between the staffs and governments behind 
the two generals.  Some historians have claimed that this competitive relationship led both 
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armies to pursue an independent “race to Moscow,” which partially explains the failure of the 
two movements to link up and form a united front.
166
  
From the tone and content of the various articles and portraits that were published, it was 
clear that a link was established between the heroic exploits of the Volunteer Army, and the 
current leadership of Admiral Kolchak.  The Volunteer Army provided the regime with a 
mythology that it had otherwise lacked, and the Omsk government presented Kolchak (and not 
Denikin) as the legitimate military successor to the volunteer’s armed insurrection for the 
salvation of Russia.
167
 Additionally, following traditional military protocol, Kolchak’s position 
as highest-ranking officer of the army placed him at the forefront of any veneration of officer 
culture, with generals and lower ranking officers all celebrating his exploits and leadership. 
 
The Cossacks 
 Along with the soldiers and officers of the newly dubbed Russian Army, the other major 
component of the Omsk government’s military power were the various Cossack regiments that 
were spread throughout the Siberian lands.  These units were organized under the traditional 
Cossack “host” (voisko), and were under direct command of the atamans that were elected by the 
soldiers and who served as the commanding officer as well as the political leader.
168
  Although 
the Cossack forces of Siberia did not occupy such a central and indispensable role to the new 
government’s legitimacy as they did in South Russia under Denikin’s government,
169
 Kolchak 
and his ministers understood that gaining and solidifying the support of the Cossacks was 
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necessary to achieve military victory over the Bolsheviks.
170
 After all, it was Cossack units under 
the command of Ataman Krasilnikov that arrested the SR members of the Directory and installed 
the Council of Ministers and Kolchak in power.
171
 
 While there were a variety of Cossack hosts and tens of thousands of soldiers spread 
throughout Siberia, the Omsk government was only able to exercise limited and often sporadic 
control over the various groups nominally under their command.  The regime’s most loyal 
Cossack supporters were those of the Siberian and Ural hosts, who were some of the first groups 
to formally recognize Kolchak’s power immediately after the coup.
172
 The Orenburg host, under 
the command of Ataman Dutov, was perhaps the most powerful and numerically strong, but its 
distance from Omsk and Dutov’s own aspirations for power meant that Kolchak was unable to 
exert much direct control.
173
  Farther to the East, the Transbaikal hosts under the command of 
Atamans Semenov and Kalmykov did not subordinate themselves to any government (although 
they received arms and funds from the Japanese), and instead sought to establish their own 
fiefdoms using brutality and violence against local populations.  Instead of being a base for 
support in the East, Semenov and his bands disrupted Kolchak’s rear and often requisitioned 
shipments of essential materiel from the Allies.
174
 
Following the coup of November 18
th
, members of the Omsk government began directly 
coordinating with Cossack leaders to create an image of the new Supreme Ruler and effectively 
introduce him to the rank and file kazaki now nominally under his command.  As seen early with 
the case of Narodnaya Gazeta, the Ministry of Information under Ustrialov did not immediately 
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assume complete control of the press and independent newspapers in Omsk, but rather 
coordinated with them and supplied articles that conveyed a unified message of the new 
government’s purpose and intentions.  This was perhaps the best way to effectively control the 
information released about Admiral Kolchak while not taking the draconian step of full-
censorship and control of the press, which would have tarnished the new government in the eyes 
of the Allies.
175
 The first post-coup edition of the newspaper Irtysh is an illustrative example of 
this initial cooperation between the Omsk government and the Cossack authorities to present a 
stylized image of the Supreme Ruler. 
Irtysh, named for the river that winds through the center of Omsk, was the official 
publication of the Siberian Cossack Host and the central newspaper for Cossacks living in the 
capital.  The first edition after the coup, which was published on 21 November, displayed the 
first declaration of Admiral Kolchak in the top center of the middle column on the front page 
with a large headline, indicating to the readers its importance amongst the other articles.
176
 
Directly below the headline is printed Official Order No. 462, signed by Colonel Berezovskii, an 
assistant to the Ataman.  The order begins by describing the fall of the Provisional Russian 
Government and the changing power situation in Siberia.  Berezovskii notes, “The severity and 
greatness of the current conflict has caused the need to concentrate full Supreme power in one 
person’s hands.”
177
  He mentions a previous declaration from the four krugs of the host that 
established the need for a power that “…would be strong, powerful, and able to protect public 
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order and to provide security from attacks from outside.”
178
  Berezovskii then confidently 
asserts: “That power has finally been created.”
179
 The order goes on to call for total support and 
recognition of Kolchak’s power, and calls for mobilization for the “salvation of the country.”
180
 
Berezovskii’s “order No. 462” is significant and telling for several reasons.  Firstly, it 
serves as a bridge to connect Kolchak’s official first declaration (which was printed in all 
newspapers and distributed around Omsk) to the local and individual interests of the Cossack 
populations.  In fact, the writing style is not that of an official order, but rather an impassioned 
attempt to enlighten and mobilize the Cossacks to service for the new regime.
181
  By connecting 
Kolchak and his government to previous Cossack ideas and programs for ideal power, 
Berezovskii argues that the Cossacks should recognize themselves (and their own interests) in the 
new regime.
182
  Secondly, Berezovskii’s description of Kolchak as one who could “provide 
security” from external threats clearly demonstrates his position as a man in charge of military 
affairs.  Only “security” and “order” are mentioned when describing the Supreme Ruler, and the 
prikaz does nothing to mention any of the other goals of the regime, or major social and political 
issues of the day. 
Following the official government addresses on the front page, an article on the second 
page of the paper gives a detailed description of Kolchak’s background and firmly cements his 
image as that of a military leader.  Entitled “Admiral Kolchak- The Supreme Ruler of Russia,” 
the article gives an in-depth account of Kolchak’s actions and exploits before the October 
Revolution, and attempts to “characterize the vibrant and strong personality of Admiral 








 Interestingly, the content of the actual “order” can be found buried at the end of the article.  It states that 
dues will be collected from all stanitsa and military organizations in the Siberian Cossack Host. 
182





 Beginning with Kolchak’s experience at Port Arthur during the Russo-Japanese 
War, the article follows the Admiral’s rapid rise through the military ranks, and special attention 
is given to the risky assaults on Kiel and Danzig under his command.  The author notes that after 
the death of Admiral Nikolai Essen, Kolchak began to play a more “increased” role in the 
Russian Navy.  The saga concludes with Kolchak’s promotion to Vice-Admiral and his taking 
command of the Black Sea Fleet, and the now-famous story of him throwing his sword 
overboard rather than surrendering it to mutineers is recounted with passionate language.
184
  
The purpose of this biographical sketch (which was written by a correspondent for the 
Russian Army- an example of the coordination among independent groups mentioned earlier) 
was to fully introduce the Supreme Ruler to the Cossack populations and to create a powerful 
image that would inspire patriotism and service.  Despite the fact that many of the rank-and-file 
Cossacks and soldiers were likely to have never heard of the Admiral, the author is quick to 
remind them that, “Admiral Aleksandr Kolchak is undoubtedly one of the most popular heroes of 
the current world war.”
185
  Although Kolchak’s experience in the navy was not ideally suited to a 
land-based conflict thousands of kilometers from the sea, the article (and many others) focused 
on his leadership traits and innate characteristics that made him ideal for the positions of 
Supreme Ruler and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.  According to the article, 
Kolchak always acted as “…a responsible chief and senior commander” filled with “wisdom.”
186
  
The image of Kolchak, standing on the bridge of the flagship with “olympic serenity” amidst 
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crashing waves and the storms of conflict was powerful and often used, a clear metaphor for 
Russia’s state of fratricidal war.
187
   
 
The Spring Offensive and Summer Reversal 
 In December 1918, only weeks after assuming power, Kolchak fell seriously ill and was 
unable to actively participate in state affairs.  His absence was also felt in the Omsk press, and 
there were no major public addresses or orders issued by him in newspapers for nearly all of the 
six weeks he was sidelined.
188
 The newspapers, however, did not suffer from a dearth of 
headline-making events during these weeks.  On December 21
st
, a collection of local workers 
and underground Bolsheviks organized an insurrection to overthrow the government and free 
political prisoners being held under guard by the Cossacks.  Incidentally, Kolchak’s police 
(militsia) forces, under none other than Viktor Pepeliaev, had discovered the plot days earlier, 
and the uprising was quickly put down.
189
 The papers had better headlines to print a few days 
later, when an army under Anatolii Pepeliaev (Viktor’s brother) captured the important industrial 
city of Perm, along with an estimated 30,000 Red prisoners and supplies.
190
 While several 
historians have challenged the true significance of the victory over the Third Red Army, the 




 Despite Admiral Kolchak’s lack of involvement in executing the capture of Perm (and his 
near total absence from government during his illness), the victory created a stir among the 
Allies, and the formal recognition of Kolchak’s Siberian government was brought into 
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discussion.  Given their government’s military involvement in Siberian affairs in support of the 
Omsk government, many British and American newspapers began running laudatory (and 
sometimes critical) articles about the new “Ruler of Siberia.”
192
 In addition to receiving news 
and declarations from pro-White groups in Paris, British and American newspapers had special 
correspondents in Omsk.  Western newspapers, like their Siberian counterparts, presented a 
stylized and simplistic image of the Admiral to their readers, which included a heavy emphasis 
on Kolchak’s military qualities. 
 For many readers in the West, the reports carried by British and American newspapers 
were the first glimpse of the Admiral, whom the American consul in Siberia John Embry called, 
“The greatest man that the Russian revolution has produced…”
193
 Many articles portrayed him 
as a man solely committed to defeating the Bolsheviks militarily.  In his first printed letter (in 
English) to the Allies, Kolchak is quoted as saying; “All my efforts are aimed at concluding the 
civil war as soon as possible by crushing bolshevism…”
194
 One article paid special attention to 
Kolchak’s military dress by noting: “He wore a plain black undress, with three black eagles 
embroidered, without the crown, on his gold shoulder-straps.”
195
 The symbolism of gold 
epaulettes (a powerful symbol in revolutionary Russia)
196
 without “the crown” on them clearly 
indicated that Kolchak was a military man, but not a Tsarist reactionary.  The same writer, who 
submitted his story from Kharbin in Manchuria, went on to vividly describe the reaction of the 
residents of Perm’ when Kolchak entered the city for the first time: “At Perm, liberated by a 
force composed exclusively of Russian regiments, the people knelt and blessed him as a 
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deliverer, crying ‘Do not forsake us.”
197
 Another article entitled “Koltchak’s Coming Offensive” 
detailed the Admiral’s tour of the front in the spring of 1919, where he was “enthusiastically 
received by the troops and civilians,” and assured all those he met with (including diverse groups 




Stories and articles detailing the Supreme Ruler’s time at the front were common during 
the spring and summer months of 1919.  The front was the natural place for the Supreme 
Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army, and the press and members of the government often 
presented the Admiral as being totally removed from any political or governmental affairs in 
Omsk, and instead focusing solely on military matters.
199
  In short news clippings and longer 
pieces, the Admiral was described as working tirelessly and “without rest” touring the front and 
meeting with soldiers and officers.
200
 Pravitel’stvenni Vestnik, the government’s official organ, 
devoted front-page space to small articles giving updates about the Admiral’s time away from 
Omsk.  The time spent among the troops was significant for the Supreme Ruler, and according to 
Jonathan Smele, detrimental to the survival of the regime: he estimates that Kolchak spent at 
least 136 days out of the 350 he was power at the front (or ill).  According to Smele, “That is to 
say, for two-fifths of his period in office in White Siberia, the desk of the Supreme Ruler 
remained unoccupied – usually because the Commander-in-Chief was at the front.”
201
 
The Supreme Ruler’s time spent touring the front included preparations for the much-
anticipated offensive that the Russian Army launched in the spring of 1919.  Initially, the 
offensive was a major success, with White armies recapturing major cities such as Ufa and 
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penetrating deep into Bolshevik-held territory.  Evan Mawdsley estimates that in only eight 
weeks, Kolchak’s armies had moved forward 250 miles and captured 115,000 square miles from 
the Reds.
202
  By mid-April, the Whites were within striking distance of Kazan and Samara, and 
had the potential to link up either with forces from Arkhangelsk to the north or Denikin to the 
south.  However, the tide quickly turned against the Whites, and a Red Army offensive (led by 
Bolshevik legend Mikhail Frunze) in late April drove the Russian Army back to its original 
positions within a few weeks.  By the summer of 1919, Kolchak’s armies had retreated behind 
the Urals and were falling back towards Omsk with great haste.
203
 
Historians and memoirists have placed blame for the Russian Army’s stunning reversal 
alternately on the stavka, and their “young, fervent, wet-behind-the-ears colonels,”
204
 or on 
Kolchak himself and his total lack of qualifications in land warfare.
205
 However, for the purposes 
of this investigation, what is important is that the Omsk press and the Ministry of Information 
under Ustrialov responded to the setbacks by increasing their production of propaganda and 
information about the Supreme Ruler.  In fact, it was only after the Russian Army was crushed 
on the field that there emerged the beginnings of what Jan Plamper called “multiple smaller 
personality cults among all fighting parties” that emerged during the civil war.
206
 It was only 
when the military and political situations were deteriorating rapidly that the nascent beginnings 
of a “personality cult” could be observed.   
The first step the regime took to promulgating and disseminating the image of the 
Supreme Ruler on a mass scale was the introduction of several new newspapers in Omsk. 
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Although there were already many newspapers in Omsk, the Russian Press Bureau introduced 
nearly a dozen new daily and weekly papers that served as pure propaganda organs for the 
regime.  The new papers were also more targeted to specific social and political groups, and 
carried both official and group-specific content. An illustrative example of this was the paper 
Krest’ianskii Vetsnik (The Peasant Herald), which was introduced on 30 July 1919 and targeted 
directly at the peasantry and rural communities in Russia.
207
 The newspaper printed the usual 
government bulletins and proclamations on the front page, but also included articles about 




As in the other papers, Kolchak was presented as a firm military leader in the pages of 
Krest’ianskii Vestnik, often making direct appeals or orders to the readers.  In one article, 
Kolchak decisively declares, “I demand from citizens and the population complete calm, self-
control and common work for the Army."
209
  In another piece, entitled “What the Supreme Ruler 
Wants,” Kolchak notes that all his efforts are given to achieving military victory, and what “he 
wants” are more recruits for the Russian Army.
210
 Other newspapers that were established 
included Nasha Gazeta (August 1919), Nash Put’ (September 1919), and Rodina (October 
1919); all of these new papers, as their titles imply, espoused heavily nationalistic attitudes and 
views along with support for the army.  An early issue of Nasha Gazeta carried a large, front-
page portrait of Admiral Kolchak in a simple black coat, with his Order of St. George and Order 
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of St. Anna displayed prominently, and a below it featured column entitled “At the Front,” which 
provided a “situation report” (operativnaya svodka) from the Supreme Headquarters.
211
  
As the White forces in the East continued their seemingly unstoppable retreat across the 
Urals and towards Omsk, the press and media outlets, now under firm government control, began 
to augment their daily publications with special editions focusing on the Supreme Ruler and the 
army.  As the political and military situation was progressively deteriorating, and with desertion 
among soldiers increasing, the Omsk Press Bureau focused its attention on promoting the role of 
the military, and specifically its Supreme Commander, as the only saviors of the Motherland.  
The cover of a supplement to the September 2
nd
 edition of Irtysh displayed a half-page size 
portrait of Admiral Kolchak, with a stern look, dark black uniform, and a prominent white Cross 
of St. George.  Beneath the image, in stylistic type, was the title “Supreme Ruler, Supreme 
Commander-in-Chief Aleksandr Vasilievich Kolchak,” with “Supreme Commander-in-Chief 
Kolchak” significantly bolder and in larger print than the other words.
212
 Notably absent from the 
image are any of the symbols that would be associated with the Tsarist system (including eagles, 
the crown, and St. Andrew's Cross), and in their place a simple military uniform with no 
epaulettes and the Cross of St. George, a symbol of military bravery.  The symbolic message of 
the portrait was that Kolchak had connection to the old order, and that he was simply a soldier 




Kolchak’s speech to the soldiers of the Mikhailovskii regiment must be viewed in the 
greater context of the proliferation of printed military speeches during the revolutionary period.  
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Trotsky famously used his fiery oratory skills to help reestablish morale and discipline in the Red 
Army after the fall of Perm, and Kerensky was known as “the idol of Army,” due to his frequent 
and impassioned speeches in front of frontline soldiers during the First World War.
214
 More 
importantly, these speeches were reprinted in newspapers and brochures and contributed to the 
development of the cult of the “leader” (vozhd) among the masses; soldiers were said to have 
read Kerensky’s speeches at the front “…not without a trembling of the soul.”
215
 The 
proliferation of the speeches of Kolchak must be seen not only as a continuation of these 
propaganda practices, but also as a unique chapter in their development in Russia during this 
period.  The image that was created for Kolchak in the press was intricately woven with the 
views and beliefs of the Omsk regime and its ideology, and although it drew upon language and 
symbols that were employed earlier, its message and intentions were quite distinct from its 
predecessors. 
The Supreme Ruler begins the speech by thanking the men of the Mikhailovskii regiment 
for their “valiant military service” and that those in positions of authority had been “closely 
watching” the regiment’s military service.  Kolchak then decisively announced (shown in bold 
print), “After the division arrived, the chief of the army reported to me that the soldiers of the 
division want to see that person for whom they fight. This is wrong: they don’t fight for me, I 
myself am a soldier and in this regard there is no difference between me and you.”
216
 The speech 
ends on a touching note when he reminds the men under his command, “Maybe I will be far 
from you, but always remember: in that difficult, most painful moment I will be there with you, 
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perhaps, in your ranks.”
217
 This remarkably informal and direct appeal to the soldiers of the 
Siberian Army, by presenting the Supreme Ruler as a simple soldier and placing him among their 
ranks, clearly demonstrates that the men of the Omsk government understood the power that 
image and propaganda held during the Civil War, and that the previous revolutions had created a 
political climate where engagement with the population was necessary.  Far from what Orlando 
Figes claimed was a “…[failure] to adapt to the new revolutionary world in which the civil war 
had to be fought,”
218
 White leaders actively pursued the creation of a stylized and popular image 
of their leader that was meant to inspire and to raise morale among the soldiers at the front. 
 
The Fall of Omsk 
 The summer of 1919 witnessed the collapse of the White drive towards Moscow, which 
was followed by a series of reversals that saw the Red Army capture the major industrial cities in 
the Urals and the Siberian Army retreat back into the steppes of Siberia.  Many of the White’s 
finest soldiers had been senselessly killed in battles around Chelyabinsk and Ufa, and ill-
conceived monetary reforms promoted by the Finance Minister Mikhailov had effectively 
destroyed the value of the government’s sibirki note and led to rampant speculation.
219
 The 
military and financial setbacks seriously weakened the government’s legitimacy in the eyes of 
the Russian people and, perhaps more importantly, the Allies.  By this time, it was clear that the 
much-desired formal recognition of the Omsk government by the Allied powers was not 
forthcoming, especially as the Armed Forces of South Russia under Denikin were making 
significant gains on the Southern Front.  Despite all of the setbacks, the press continued to print 
daily papers on increasingly rare paper, and the regime continued to promote the image of 
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 In the fall of 1919, the Siberian Army underwent a massive command reorganization and 
formed a new defensive line along the river Tobol’, and the unpopular General Lebedev was 
replaced by as commander of the army Mikhail Diterikhs.  Desertion was becoming an 
increasing blight on the Siberian Army ability to fight, and several steps were taken to help 
improve morale among the rank-and-file, including the introduction of a new medal, the Order of 
St. Mikhail the Archangel, for “Uralites” (Ural’tsy) who had distinguished themselves in the 
previous months’ fighting.
221
 Elaborate military ceremonies were held in front of soldiers and 
officers, with one that featured Kolchak presenting one his commanders with a sword that was 
rumored to have belonged to Jan Sobieski of Poland, the “savior of Christendom.”
222
  Kolchak 
toured the front frequently during this time, in large part supporting the preparations for the 
Tobol’sk offensive, which was supposed to deliver the decisive blow against the Red Army and 
drive the Bolsheviks back out of Siberia.
223
  
Despite early gains in September of 1919, the arrival of Bolshevik reinforcements and the 
lack of new recruits from White territories spelled doom for the Siberian Army, and within 
weeks its shattered remnants were streaming back towards Omsk.  The mood in the capital, now 
filled with thousands of officers and upper-class families who fled from the Bolsheviks, quickly 
descended into fear and panic as the soldiers from the front returned; according to Ustrialov, “At 
the front, things are bad, catastrophic in fact.  The fall of Omsk, evidently, is inevitable.”
224
  
Thousands of people fled the city and headed east towards Irkutsk, which was to be the new seat 
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of the government.  While the clogged railway station was packed with those desperately trying 
to escape, Kolchak confidently assured all that “The Army will have everything it needs,” and 
that the end of Russia’s time of troubles (smutnoe vremya) would be soon upon them.
225
 The city 
fell to Bolshevik forces on November 14
th
, just days before the one-year anniversary of the coup 
d’état that had placed the Supreme Ruler in power.  Kolchak was one of the last major 
government officials to leave the city; as Smele notes, “…like a captain on the bridge of a 
sinking ship, Kolchak refused to abandon his doomed capital until the last possible moment.”
226
 
 The massive exodus from Omsk towards Irkutsk wreaked havoc on the already 
overextended resources of Siberia’s railways, as civilians and soldiers battled to make it on to the 
few railroad cars that were still running.  Since he had stayed until the last possible moment, 
Kolchak found himself separated from his army and most of the ministers of his government, and 
with only the protection of a small guard and Allied flags on his train.  Also as the political 
situation in Siberia deteriorated, it became clear to the remaining Allied commanders (mainly 
Maurice Janin and the Czech general Jan Syrovy) that without their protection, Kolchak would 
be captured and arrested by either the Bolsheviks or local socialist forces.  While there is much 
debate as to whether General Janin had acted deliberately to trade Kolchak for the safe passage 
of the Czechoslovak region, or that he underestimated the connections of local socialists to the 
Bolsheviks, it is clear that Janin’s action or inaction led to the capture of the Supreme Ruler by 
the SR dominated Political Center in Irkutsk, where he was immediately imprisoned.
227
 
 As the remains of the White army rapidly made its way towards Irkustk, led now by the 
new Commander-in-Chief of the army, Vladimir Kappel’, members of the Bolshevik-run revkom 
and other socialist organizations became concerned that the Political Center would not be able to 
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protect the city, and that the admiral would be gifted back to his legions.  At an extraordinary 
meeting of local political parties, the Supreme Ruler and Viktor Pepeliaev, the last minister in 
the government to stand with Kolchak, were turned over the revkom and the representatives of 
the Cheka in the city.  A special Extraordinary Examination Committee subjected Kolchak to an 
official inquisition, where he recounted his past and involvement in counterrevolutionary 




 The deposition was cut short (to the 
frustration of historians) by the impending arrival of the White columns that were the advance 
guard for the remnants of the army, and Kolchak and Pepeliaev were sentenced to death by 
authorities in Moscow.  In the early hours of February 7
th
, 1920, the Supreme Ruler of All-
Russia and his faithful servant Viktor Pepeliaev were taken out of their cells and onto the frozen 
river winding through Irkutsk, where they were shot by firing squad.  Their bodies were then 






The images and symbols of the Supreme Ruler that were presented to the soldiers of the 
Russian Army and the Cossacks in the days after the coup of November 18
th
 were of a man who 
selflessly served his country in battle against her enemies.  The task of creating and presenting an 
idealized image of Kolchak as a military man for military consumption was paramount, since the 
new regime based much of its legitimacy on the army.  As Kolchak himself noted, 
“…dictatorship can be based only on an army, and that only a person who creates an army and 
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leans upon it can speak of dictatorship.”
230
 With the creation of new several new newspapers 
directed at rank-and-file soldiers and officers, and early cooperation with independent papers like 
Irtysh, the Russian Press Bureau under Ustrialov was able to control and disseminate the 
information available concerning the admiral and present him as a purely military leader.
231
 
These articles, songs, and addresses were, in effect, part of an attempt to create a “mask” for 
Kolchak to appeal to the troops.  The various publications endeavored to produce an “epic” 




 The military “mask” that was fashioned for the Supreme Ruler was not purely for 
military consumption, and the image of Kolchak as Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the 
military was spread throughout newspapers meant for civilians in Omsk, which in turn was part 
of a developing process of reevaluation of power and its forms that began after the revolution.  
The idea of the head of the state as a military commander had strong precedents in Russian 
history, beginning with Peter the Great’s modernization of the Russian army and navy in the 
early 18
th
 century.  Nicholas II fashioned a public image of himself as a military leader who 
connected with both the officer elite and the rank and file soldier, who supposedly “personally 
direct[ed] all military affairs.”
233
 “Comrade Kerensky,” despite his total lack of military 
background, styled himself as a simple soldier when he famously toured the front in 1917 and 
was known by many as “the irreplaceable leader of our revolutionary forces.”
234
 As the social 
and political situation deteriorated further towards chaos after the fall of the Tsar, the association 
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of power with the military wound tighter within a political climate characterized by what Figes 
and Kolonitskii termed “the personalization of ideas” and the “fetishization of the individual.”
235
 
 Thus, when Kolchak assumed the title of Supreme Ruler, his “mask” was already 
prepared for him.  The Kadets in power in Omsk had arrived at the belief in military dictatorship 
after a dynamic process that saw the party lose all faith in the ability of representative forms of 
power to preserve the integrity of the Russian state.  The army was the only body that offered 
salvation from the Bolsheviks and the destruction of the Motherland, and the first duty of the 
newly appointed Supreme Ruler was the defeat of the Bolsheviks on the battlefield.  Kolchak’s 
public image was shaped around his military past and present leadership through the gauntlet of 
the civil war, and daily newspapers idealized him as a simple soldier with no political ambitions 
who was simply serving his duty to his country; in Guins’ words, a “Russian [George] 
Washington.”
236
 Through public speeches and ceremonies, Kolchak presented himself as an heir 
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“I have always been a supporter of order and “state-minded responsibility” and now in particular I will demand of 
everyone not only respect for the law but also that which is most important of all in the process of resurrecting that 
State - the support of order.”
237




 For the Kadet ministers in the Kolchak's Omsk government, one of the greatest perceived 
threats to law and order was the instability of partisan and democratic politics.  Although the 
party had once championed Duma politics and reform within the Tsarist political system, the 
members of the VOTsK were deeply suspicious and fearful of political infighting.  They 
consistently deplored the political bickering and partisanship that marked the Komuch and PSG 
short existences, and had ultimately used it as an excuse for the overthrow of the Directory.
238
 In 
its place, they established a unipersonal military dictatorship, which was to be free of political 
intrigue and compromise, and which many hoped would lead Russia out of the maelstrom of 
civil war.  “Party Politics” for many Kadets meant compromising or even simply dealing with 
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socialist parties, especially the Socialist Revolutionaries, whom they considered to be “more 
deserving of contempt than the most odious Tsarist officials.”
239
 The Party had in always 
considered itself “nadpartiinaia,” but irrevocably turned against the political system after the 
elections for the Constituent Assembly, which saw the SRs gaining a clear majority in the body 
and the Kadets achieving little representation or power.  Many right-wingers even blamed the 
SRs for the October Revolution and the subsequent loss of a “legitimate authority” in Russia, and 
Kadets often viewed them as nothing more than Bolsheviks.   
The Siberian Kadets were particularly hostile to the SRs, and it was said that Zhardetskii 
refused to correctly pronounce the party’s name, even when dealing with directly with them at 
the Ufa State Conference.
240
 After the coup of November 18
th
, all SRs in the former Directory 
and even moderate socialists were expelled from the government or arrested by reactionary 
groups in Omsk, and affiliate of all political parties in local governments were targeted and 
harassed throughout Siberia by military authorities.  With the Kadets in power, all forms of 
political opposition to the state were regarded as treasonous, and the party was determined to 
cement its control over the government and society.  As Guins noted, “Bright joy penetrated our 
hearts; our hopes lit up with the creation of a strong military power to bring a stop to party 
strife.”
241
  Kolchak shared the hostile views of the Kadets, and through a direct he banned 
anyone in the military or public service from joining a political party, attending any kind of 
demonstration, or even publically commenting on political affairs.
242
 The elimination of political 
parties and the discord they sowed was seen as a crucial and necessary measure to restoring order 
to a country that had been torn apart by revolution and civil war. 
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Additionally, the Kadets’ longstanding commitment to the concept of “state mindedness” 
(gosudarstvennost') meant that only “national-thinking” and absolute support for authority were 
acceptable.  Since the October Revolution, the Kadets demanded support for “general-national” 
(obshchenatsional’nye) reconstruction of the “free Russian state,” with specific programs and 
policies of less importance than mass support for the nation.
243
 A national commitment to 
gosudarstvennost’, the Kadets believed, would help awaken a new “state consciousness” among 
the Russia people, which they believed had been eroded by the fall of the monarchy and the 
collapse of legitimate authority.  The concept of gosudarstvennost’ was also a convenient path to 
solidifying and centralizing Kadet control of the government, as all other social and political 
interests were meant to the be subordinated to the interests of the state, and even assurances of 
democratic representation were followed by condemnations of popular demands.
244
  By the time 
many of the Kadets went east to join the “democratic counterrevolution” in 1918, the concept of 
gosudarstvennost’ had become a justification for conservative authoritarian rule. 
“National reconstruction” required the reestablishment of one of the Kadets’ oldest 
established political values, the devotion to the rule of law and order.  Stemming from their 
involvement in the creation of the first State Duma after the Revolution of 1905, the Party had 
long championed “the rule of law” and “legitimate authority,” and had used this relatively 
ambiguous position to avoid direct conflicts with the left and the right during the July Days.  
While the Provisional Government employed slogans celebrating “republicanism,” and Red 
Guards sang the “Internationale,” the Kadets’ supporters celebrated “the faith of law, justice, 
freedom and the honor of men,” which was “the greatest weapon in the land.”
245
  What made the 
position ambiguous was the oft-changing definition of what “legitimate law,” as seen by the 
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Kadets’ rejection of the SR dominated Constituent Assembly, which they claimed could not 
provide civil order or uphold the rule of law.
246
 
The support for law and order and the rejection of political parties that had been ossified 
in the crucible of the revolutionary days were firmly embraced by the Kadets of the VOTsK and 
the PSG.  Kadet hostilities towards the Komuch and the Directory centered on the political 
infighting within the bodies and the rapid deterioration of Russian society into what they 
considered anarchy; as Guins notes, “Concentration of power is necessary for the active struggle 
against anti-state parties…[who] are bringing disruption to the economic life of the country and 
to public order and stability.”
247
 The restoration of order and the rule of law in Russia became the 
main political justification for the Kadets to assume leadership of the anti-Bolshevik movement 
in the east, and for the overthrow of the Directory.  Once in power, the Party also used the 
concept to maintain dictatorship and delay the convocation of a new “national assembly,” as 
“Time will provide the necessary conditions in the life of the country when it is finally ruled by 
law and order, and then it will be possible to begin to convening of the National Assembly.”
248
 
These ideas and arguments were the primary raison d’etre of the military dictatorship in 
Siberia, and it was therefore necessary to present the head of the dictatorship, the Supreme Ruler, 
as being totally apolitical in word and deed and committed to the restoration of order.  This task 
was made a bit easier given Kolchak’s total lack of background or experience in political affairs.  
As he himself noted, “I grew up under the influence of an entirely military atmosphere and 
milieu…I hardly interested myself with any political problems.  So far as I can tell, I remember 
nothing at all concerning questions of a political or social nature.”
249
 For the Supreme Ruler and 
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the members of his government, Russia “…needed only ‘authority’ and ‘order,”
250
 and all other 
social and political issues were subordinated until the Bolsheviks were defeated and legitimate 
authority established.  Thus the responsibilities of the position were twofold, as Ustrialov noted:  
The dictator whom the Party…recognizes is not only the dictator-liberator (diktator-osvoboditel’) but is at the same 
time the dictator-organizer (diktator-ustroitel’); his tasks include not only the liberation [of Russia] from the 




 Admiral Kolchak’s first public address after the coup of November18 made unmistakably 
clear his attitude towards politics: “…I declare: I will follow neither the path or reaction nor the 
fatal path of party politics.”
252
 As with the military matters discussed earlier, stating the 
Admiral’s opposition to politics in his first address displayed its significance to the identity of 
Kolchak as a leader and to his government.  The slogan “I will follow neither the path of reaction 
nor the fatal path of party politics” became one of the key slogans of the new regime, in a time 
when simple slogans and phrases proliferated all levels of Russian society and held considerable 
sway among the masses.
253
  These slogans were meant to appeal to all levels and strata’s of 
Russian society and to provide a point of common experience for all citizens; as Lasswell notes, 
“…one of the few experiences that binds human beings together, irrespective of race, region, 
occupation, party, or religion, is exposure to the same set of key words.”
254
 While the efficacy of 
the slogans of the Omsk regime is certainly questionable, their sheer and frequent mass 
reproduction in newspapers and propaganda at the very least provided the foundation for a 
“common experience” in the territories under White control. 
 In the weeks after the coup, the Russian Press Bureau employed the press organs now 
under their control to disseminate numerous articles and statements from the Supreme Ruler 
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regarding his steadfast dedication to rebuilding the Russian state and restoring order, of which 
many were intended for international consumption.  One significant speech, published by the 
government’s official newspaper, captured his views clearly and succinctly: 
With deep sincerity, I declare to you now…that I am more firmly than ever convinced that in this time the State may 
live and be revived only upon a solid, democratic foundation.  I have always been a supporter of order and 
gosudarstvennost’ and now in particular I demand of everyone not only respect for the law but also that which is 




  Kolchak’s demand for citizens to respect the law marks a departure from the language 
used to present Kolchak as a military man.  As Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Army, it 
was his duty to boost the morale of his soldiers and to identify with them, and to inspire men to 
join the ranks in the struggle against the Bolsheviks.  However, as Supreme Ruler, Kolchak’s 
role changed to that of the “shrine incarnate of the state order,”
256
 whose job it was to strengthen 
the power of the state and to reinstall discipline and order to a society on the verge of collapse.  
An address from Kolchak directed to the people in the peasant’s newspaper Krest’ianskii 
Vestnik’ read “I demand of the citizens and the population full calm, courage, and common 
work…”
257
 Although he began his first declaration after the coup d’état with “To the People,” 
“Citizens” was the most common address used to by Kolchak in his printed addresses in the 
newspapers.
258
 For the Supreme Ruler, nearly all of the official language regarding order and 
support for the state was couched in terms such as “responsibilities of the people” (narodnyi 
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 When the conspiratorial forces of Kadets and officers were preparing to overthrow the 
Directoy and install a military dictator, they drew strong support from members of Russia’s so-
called “trade-industrial” (torgovo-promyshlennyi) class, who had a vested interest in the defeat of 
Bolshevism.  The influential Trades and Industry Congress, which had lobbied for dictatorship as 
early as the summer of 1918, was one of the first social organizations to send greetings to the 
new regime.
260
 Commercial and industrial classes were a key constituency of the Omsk 
government, as nearly all those in the ministries (including the former socialist Minister of 
Finance Mikhailov) were ardent proponents of free trade and laissez-faire economics.  The warm 
feeling between the government and the trades was mutual, as law and order was necessary for 
the functioning of healthy economic growth and the development of stable markets for goods.  
Numerous prominent businessmen actively participated in the economic affairs of the state, in 
particular S.G. Fedos’ev, who was a manager of several large Siberian mining companies and 
who oversaw the Supreme Ruler’s plan for the reintroduction of free trade in Siberia.  Fedos’ev’s 
program included the liquidation of the Ministry of Supply, which had previously controlled the 
distribution of food, supplies, and other goods.
261
 
 The connections between the Omsk government and private business interests were not 
secret, as the Supreme Ruler often discussed the important role that free trade and industry 
played in the development of the Russian state.  This public support of industry and finance by 
the government led many, especially those in the SR camp, to accuse the government of merely 
being “a front for a syndicate of speculators and financiers.”
262
 Within the Omsk press, Kolchak 
was presented as a staunch advocate for freedom of trade and private business, as they 
contributed to the reestablishment of order and the development of “healthy” state conditions.  
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The newspaper of industry and trade in Siberia, Torgovo-Promyshlennyi Vestnik, provided 
extensive coverage of Admiral Kolchak’s meetings with business leaders and his pledges to 
restore economic order.  At a conference of the Union of Trade-Industry in Ufa, the Supreme 
Ruler pledged to address the needs of industry for “…the reconstruction of transport and the 
establishment of a banking,” and that those present, “from the ranks of the trade-industry class,” 
were truly “heroes” (bogatyry) of the motherland.
263
   
 Just days after taking office, Kolchak publically announced the founding of the 
“Extraordinary State Economic Conference,” which was ostensibly a forum to discuss a wide-
range of economic issues, but in reality was a meeting to officially promote the interests of the 
trade-industrial classes.
264
 Weeks after it’s the creation, the first meeting of the State Economic 
Conference (SEC) in Omsk saw representatives from nearly all the major government ministries, 
and from the major commercial and trade organizations and industries.  The existence of the 
body was important to the image of the Supreme Ruler, as it demonstrated his commitment to 
free trade and industry while also showing his involvement in societal affairs.  While Kolchak 
publically praised the semi-representative organization’s work in helping to rebuild the economy, 
the body’s actual duties and powers were quite vague, aside from its most important task of 
feeding and supplying the army.  Military authorities that had no interest in diluting their power 
or cooperating too closely with civilian authorities performed many of the conference’s 
responsibilities.  The first iteration of the SEC was not able to accomplish anything significant, 
perhaps not in small part because of Fedos’ev’s antagonistic relationship with Mikhailov.  It was 
not until the summer of 1919, with new economic challenges arising as the Whites conquered 
more territory that talks began to circulate about reviving the SEC on a larger and more 
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representative scale.  With strong personal support from the Kolchak, the new conference that 
was proposed would not only expand the number of groups and interests represented, but would 
also serve to showcase the power and stability that the Omsk regime had created.
265
 
 The State Economic Conference in Omsk on June 19
th
, 1919 was a large ceremonial 
spectacle that saw Admiral Kolchak at the height of his “mask-wearing,” lavishly presented as 
the figurehead of the anti-Bolshevik movement and the embodiment its values.  The conference, 
which was held in the ceremonial hall of the Justice Chambers, was a carefully orchestrated 
presentation of Kolchak as the savior of Russia and the harbinger of a new form of power that 
would make Russia stronger.  Facing the assembly was a raised platform resembling a throne, 
where Kolchak sat side by side with Vologodskii and the Conference’s chairman, Guins; above 
their heads was a huge portrait of Alexander II, the “Liberator Tsar.”
266
  As Richard Wortman 
has argued, ceremonies such as these held a long tradition in Russian politics, and were meant a 
display of the regime’s power and legitimacy.  According to Wortman, “…ceremonies of the 
autocracy presented a cognitive map of the political order, one of the ‘particular models or 




 With the presentation of Kolchak harkening to the salvation and reform of Russia, the 
Supreme Ruler began his remarks by calling for a return to order and calm after the defeat of 
Bolshevism, and the creation of a new system that would be “responsible to will of the people.” 
He then went on to call for the creation and solidification of “economic order,” which he argued 
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in large part depended on the solution to the “labor question.”
268
  He stressed the importance of 
economic matters by saying, “…as far as the government itself is concerned one of the most 
urgent problems of the moment is the formation of the conference, where public opinion has the 
fullest opportunity to voice criticism and present its own suggestions.” The newly convened 
conference would be bestowed with broad powers to help facilitate economic growth and would 




 Kolchak’s speech to the SEC contained several overtures in support of workers right and 
improving working conditions, employing language that had largely been absent from the 
official discourse of the regime in the previous months.  This is because Kolchak’s public 
support for labor issues and workers was largely a “mask,” which reflected how the Omsk 
government sought to be perceived and not the reality of their policies.  As the initial military 
success of the Spring Offensive increased the domestic and international stature of the regime, 
the ministers of the government became increasingly interested in portraying the Supreme Ruler 
as a champion of the workers.  In order to placate both the Allies and the urban residents that 
were now under their control, the Omsk press and the numerous other newspapers under their 
control presented Kolchak as a supporter of the rights of workers and unions, whose legal rights 
would be fully confirmed after the convening of the Constituent Assembly in Moscow.
270
  
 The Supreme Ruler’s appeal to the workers and support for labor issues was a key 
strategy to preserve law and owner in White territories and to help restart Siberian industry.  
Strikes and labor unrest had plagued the former administration Provisional Siberian Government, 
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and the situation had only deteriorated after the coup of November 18
th
; as Smele estimates, 
“…the figures would seem to indicate that at least one-third of the known total of Siberia’s pre-
revolutionary workforce took industrial action during [Kolchak’s rule].”
271
 These strikes 
disturbed the Siberian economy and society, and Kolchak attempted to quell them by coming out 
in support the workers and their interests.  A front-page story in all the papers of the Omsk press 
featured a high-profile meeting between the Supreme Ruler and a delegation of the Union f 
Printers, where they (quite briefly) discussed the concerns of printers and laborers across the 
country and Kolchak’s demand that “in times of war no form of strike action was permitted.”
272
 
Kolchak expressed his personal support for labor organizations, and stated: “The above 
conversation…defines the strong relationship between the government and the workers, who can 
be assured that their legitimate interests will always be protected.”
273
 In another paper, Kolchak 
pledged the unflinching “support of the Ministry of Labor” for labor organizations and interests, 
which compared favorably with the position of workers in Sovdepia, where the Soviets had 
destroyed the “normal working conditions of the worker.”
274
 
 The extensive propaganda campaign and innumerable public speeches in support of 
workers by the Supreme Ruler could not fully conceal the Omsk government’s hostility towards 
workers and labor organizations.  The military authorities often regarded workers and unions as 
being innate supporters of Bolshevism, and they undertook a campaign throughout 1919 to 
violently disband unions and suppress strikes.  The ministers of government thoroughly 
supported the interests of the trade-industry class and free trade, and thus while Kolchak was 
publically declaring that the government had been instructed to draft a law establishing an eight-
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 no such law was ever seriously discussed by the ministers.
276
 The image of the 
Supreme Ruler as a champion of workers’ rights was constructed in part to appeal to the Allies, 
but it was also deployed in an attempt to restore order and the rule of law by giving the workers a 
leader who supported their interests and who was working to improve their lives.  Strikes and 
labor unrest were significant challenges to the establishment of a “healthy,” and instead of 
crafting policies to address the key issues, they undertook a propaganda campaign to depict 
Admiral Kolchak as a progressive supporter of labor in attempt to subdue the work of unions. 
 Despite the high note of representation and inclusion that was struck at the State 
Economic Conference in Omsk, the SEC would again fall prey to the suspicions of military 
authorities, which regarded the body as a “nest of Kerenskyism.”
277
 Kolchak’s public support for 
the conference waned as the military situation deteriorated in the late summer months of 1919, as 
the body was beginning to call for more direct involvement in government affairs and shaping 
policy.  They even called for the conference to be the official representative body of the 
government, which would recommend laws for passage and curb the power of the Supreme 
Ruler.  Kolchak refused to even meet with the delegation that brought this proposal, after which 
the body ceased to become anything other than a rubberstamp assembly with no real power.  The 
“rightward” turn of the government in the fall of 1919 meant the ministers were more concerned 
with consolidating power and working with syndicates, not elected assemblies.
278
  
 The construction of the image of the Supreme Ruler as a champion of free trade and 
thoroughly committed to improving the economic situation of the country was part of the 
deliberate process of presenting Admiral Kolchak as the harbinger of law and order.  Being seen 
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as a supporter of the interests of the trade-industry class and the development of private 
enterprise was imperative to their support in supplying the army and laying the economic 
foundations for a “healthy” state.  At the State Economic Conference of June 19
th
 the Supreme 
Ruler showcased his support and direct involvement with the affairs of private enterprise, as well 
as symbolically demonstrating the legitimacy of his power.  Additionally, by assuming the 
mantle of champion of the workers, Kolchak appealed to labor organizations to preserve order 
and stop striking, in return for the recognition of their interests and improvement of working 
conditions.  The public support of both trade and industry and workers by the Supreme Ruler 
was truly a “mask,” and did not reflect the actions of the military authorities and the government.  
Instead of adopting necessary progressive policies, the Omsk government, under pressure from 
both Russia society and the Allies, chose to fashion an image of the Supreme Ruler that they 
hoped would quell disorder and unite different societal factions behind the regime.  
 
The Land Question 
 One of the strongest threats to the stability of law and order in the territories under 
Kolchak’s control was the question of property ownership of the land.  Siberia, unlike European 
Russia, did not have a long tradition of large estates and there were very few of the widely 
reviled private landowners (pomeshchiki) amongst the population.
279
 At first this was a major 
advantage for the Omsk government, as they were able to delay formulating a concrete agrarian 
policy, and given the close relationship between state officials and private landowners who had 
fled from the Bolsheviks but held considerable political sway in Omsk.  In the first months of 
Kolchak’s rule, the Provisional Siberian Government’s land decree of July 6, 1918, which 
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established the restoration of all estates and properties to their prerevolutionary owners.  This 
law was finally repealed only after White troops had captured Ufa in April 1919 and began to 




 This confrontation with populations with long-held prejudices against estates and who 
supported the revolutionary redistribution of land to the peasants forced Kolchak’s government 
to formulate a coherent land policy that addressed these issues.  This was no easy task for either 
the Supreme Ruler or his ministers to undertake, as there were stark ideological divisions within 
the government that prevented a consensus being formed amongst those in power.  Some of the 
more moderate factions in the government (including Kolchak himself) argued that it was 
necessary to gain the support of the peasantry, and therefore acknowledge the validity of the 
peasant’s land seizures.  Those on the right, including Mikhailov and Lebedev, believed that 
recognizing the land seizures was a gross violation of the laws of private property and therefore 
illegal.
281
 Thus, when it came time make a formal stance on the most pressing social issue of the 
day, the Omsk government’s program failed to satisfy either side and further alienated the 
Russian people. 
 On April 10
th
, 1918, the newspapers in Omsk published excerpts from one of Kolchak’s 
speeches that contained the government’s first official land policy, the “Decree on Land of April 
8
th
.”  He declared: “Everyone who now possesses land, everyone who has sown and worked 
upon it, will have the right to gather in the harvest.”
282
  The decree was published in every major 
news outlet the Omsk government had any control over, and as Smele notes: “Indeed, the 
gramota was the government’s most widely publicized piece of land policy – perhaps of any 
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policy – both at home and abroad.”
283
 Despite the government’s enthusiasm for the decree, it was 
clear to all those who read it that it avoided the major issue, i.e. ownership of the land, and 
instead only guaranteed the peasant’s right to work the land in 1919.  The decree stated that this 
question would only be resolved at a later date with the convening of the Constituent Assembly 
and the defeat of the Bolsheviks.  This ambiguity exasperated both the peasants, many of whom 
saw a return to the old system lurking in the shadows, and the landowners, who wanted explicit 
guarantees on the rights of their property.  This led to instability within the White territories 
(especially those that were captured during the Spring Offensive), and became a cause of great 
concern for an administration whose primary goal was the restoration of order.
284
 
 Increasing peasant discontent and resistance to the policies of the Omsk government 
further exacerbated the failure of the Spring Offensive and the subsequent reversals suffered by 
the White armies in the summer of 1919.  While the immediate concern for the military 
authorities were the mass desertions and lack of new recruits for the army, other members of the 
regime began to voice their arguments in favor of a comprehensive land policy in order to 
stabilize the social situation in the territories now under White control.  Framed now as a 
question of preserving the rule of law in the countryside, the ministers, officers of the stavka, and 
the newly formed and influential Eastern Section of the Union of Russian Landowners, came to a 
compromise through which the seized lands would pass into the stewardship of the state, after 
which it be leased back to the peasants until the new Constituent Assembly was convened.  The 
“Statute” (polozhenie) of April 13
th
, although more comprehensive than anything proposed by 
previous SR-dominated governments in Siberia, again failed to answer the underlying issues for 
the peasants, and actually created new administrative problems for a government whose 
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resources were already stretched dangerously thin. Additionally, as Guins notes, most peasants 
did not understand the complexities and ambiguities of government’s law, and many simply 
concluded that Kolchak’s government was returning their land to the estate owners.
285
 
 Despite the internal dissention and bickering within the government in regards to the land 
question, in the press the Supreme Ruler was presented totally supporting the peasant’s claims to 
the land that they harvested.  In order to quell rising dissent and to combat the partisan 
movements that were growing behind the frontlines, Kolchak declared, “I and my Government 
consider it just and necessary to give all the land to the working people.”
286
 He went on to say, “I 
spoke these words for the whole world to hear…and I stand by my words.  Remember that 
firmly, and do not believe the cheating-Bolsheviks.”
287
 Kochak’s strong statements were 
intended to convince the peasant masses of Russia that the Supreme Ruler favored their rightful 
claim to the land, and that agitation against the regime and claims that they were restoring the old 
system were unwarranted. 
 A successful resolution of the land question was innately tied to the preservation of law 
and order, and to the survival of the Omsk government.  The Supreme Ruler expounded this 
connection when he asserted, “the land will go to the working people…and through the 
Constituent Assembly, the people will establish the appropriate state order.”
288
 With the land 
passing into the hands of the peasants, they were now responsible to help create and uphold 
societal order and to respect the rule of law.  According to Kolchak, this participation of the 
peasants in the creation of the new state stood in stark contrast to what was happening in 
Sovdepia, where “Every passing day the power of the Soviet people’s commissars postpones the 
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hour when Russia’s land goes over into the hands of the peasant-farmers, who love their 
motherland and are rescuing her in troubled times.”
289
 This claim was exceptionally ineffectual, 




 In spite of the Supreme Ruler’s widely publicized (albeit at times tepid) support of the 
peasant’s rightful ownership of the land, the Omsk government was never able to win the favor 
of the Russian masses.  As internal divisions prevented the government from developing a clear 
and cogent land policy during the critical summer of 1919, peasant communities began passing 
resolutions refusing to recognize any government other than the Constituent Assembly, and in 
the meantime no taxes or recruits would be provided.  The retaliation brigades that were sent into 
the countryside to crush these uprisings and their cruel methods further alienated the peasants 
from the Kolchak government and seriously eroded its legitimacy in rural areas.
291
 The often 
arbitrary and pitiless punishments meted out by forces claiming to represent the government, 
especially in eastern Siberia under the rule of the Cossack Atamans (Atamanshchina), largely 
discredited the image of Kolchak and his ability to uphold the rule of law and order.  The best 
efforts of the Russian Press Bureau and the ideologues in Omsk to present the Supreme Ruler as 
a defender of the peasant’s legal rights could not overcome the reality on the ground that was 
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 In addition to the land question, another matter of vital importance to the authority of the 
regime was the sought-after recognition of the Omsk government by the Allied powers as the 
legitimate power in Russia.  As Soviet historians have long eagerly discussed, the Allied forces 
had intervened in the Russian Civil War by sending soldiers to protect key ports, cities, and 
railroads, as well as sending ammunition and military materiel to Kolchak’s government.  Great 
Britain sent detachments of soldiers to directly Omsk and Arkhangel’sk (as well as being 
accused of participating in the coup), the French had sent several military advisors and supplies, 
and the United States had positioned troops in Vladivostok and along the Trans-Siberian 
railroad.
293
 Despite their large military presence and commitment to the anti-Bolshevik struggle, 
and unlike the soldiers of the Czechoslovak legion who had ignited the resistance in the East, the 
Allied forces largely remained absent from combat with the Red Army.  The ministers in Omsk 
understood the reality that the Allies were unlikely to engage the Bolsheviks militarily, and they 
settled for attempting to gain international legitimacy for their movement, and a seat at the Paris 
Peace talks after the end of the First World War. 
 Immediately following the coup d’état of November 18
th
, the Foreign Ministry under 
Ivan Sukin began to communicate directly with the Allies about the possibility of being 
recognized as the legitimate government in Russia.  As Sukin remembered, “The work of every 
department of our government came upon the necessity of obtaining the support of the powers – 
we needed foreign aid for the railway, for the army, in matters of trade, finance, and even 
education.”
294
 General Konstantin Sakharov, a prominent military commander in Omsk, 
concurred:  “The very word "recognition" was loudly, directly and openly pronounced. It should 
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be noted that the act of formal recognition hung in the air all of the time, like a specter 
(prizrak).”
295
 The pursuit of recognition was made by Denikin and Miller’s acknowledgment of 
Admiral Kolchak as the leader of the anti-Bolshevik movement, which helped avoid a potential 
power struggle between the South and the East.
296
  
 Sukin and the other ministers in Omsk understood the potential power of Admiral 
Kolchak becoming recognized as the legitimate and legal head of state of Russia.  Adhering to 
the principles of international law was necessary not only because of the desperate need for 
supplies and weapons, but also to boost the legitimacy of a regime that claimed one of its main 
goals to be the restoration of law and order.  The Kadets within the government had been staunch 
defenders of the rule of law, both domestic and international, and they held a strong commitment 
to honor the debts of Imperial Russia among the Allies.
297
 Legal recognition by the Allied 
powers would bestow the Supreme Ruler the authority to speak on behalf of Russia on the world 
stage, and would provide international endorsement for the programs and policies of his 
government.  However, to the dismay of many in the right-wing circles of Omsk, one of the key 
means to achieve recognition was a commitment to the now en vogue principles of democracy 
and self-determination, which emerged from the Paris peace talks and the Treaty of Versailles.  
 On May 26
th
, 1919, the Allies sent a formal note to the Omsk government that included a 
list of conditions that the Supreme Ruler was to fulfill, followed by the promise of Kolchak’s 
eventual recognition if the terms were met.  They included the necessity of convening the 
Constituent Assembly once the White armies reached Moscow, the promise of free elections, and 
a guarantee that Kolchak’s Russia would join the League of Nations and honor all of the debts of 
Tsarist Russia.  Although the democratic requirements of the communiqué worried some in the 
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monarchist camp, many realized that these were not concrete conditions, and that they would be 
able to “speak in a different tone once the Russian Army was in Moscow.”
298
 Thus, while the 
regime’s true commitment to democracy remained ambiguous if not hostile, the Supreme Ruler 
was presented in the press as being a champion of democracy and the people’s rights and in 
support of the convocation of the Constituent Assembly after victory was achieved.  As well, 
Kolchak’s support for democracy was innately tied to the concept of the supposed legality of the 
democratic process, which the government sought to claim as its mantle. 
 In a weekly publication in the nationalistic newspaper Russkoe Delo entitled “Russian 
Society and the Supreme Ruler,” prominent national scholars and politicians (many from 
Denikin’s camp) discussed the role the admiral played in the shaping of the new Russian 
government.  In the paper’s first edition, M.M. Fedorov wrote that Kolchak would, “…lay the 
foundations for a new life according to the will of the people,” through his efforts to convene the 
Constituent Assembly.
299
 In another issue, professor I.P. Aleksinskii called him a “dictator-
liberator,” while others praised his commitment to constructing a democratic state.”
300
 The 
column was meant provide intellectual support for the Supreme Ruler, and to demonstrate that he 
shared support for the Constituent Assembly with other nationally recognizable public figures, 
many of who served in high-ranking positions in Denikin’s government.  The Omsk government 
relied on sympathetic members of the intelligentsia and public figures, as well as the British 
officers in Omsk, to gain legitimate international recognition for the supposed “democratic” 
state. 
 The regime initially benefitted greatly from the presence of the British Military Mission 
(Britmis) in Omsk, and the officers in charge reported back to London that Kolchak was a 
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staunch supporter of democratic principles.  General Alfred Knox promoted the Supreme Ruler 
as being a democrat both in the Western press and in Russia itself, undertaking a propaganda 
campaign appealing to railway workers in Siberia.
301
  Colonel John Ward defended the image of 
Kolchak in Britain in an article entitled “The Truth about the Supreme Ruler.”  In the piece, 
Ward protested against the criticisms from Britain about Kolchak bringing the “restoration of the 
old system,” and firmly declared, “He is a sincere democrat by conviction, and shares English 
views on the state’s structure.”
302
 A special correspondent writing for The Times, who was 
present at the first meeting between Kolchak and Ward, noted that “So strongly did Koltchak 
impress us on this occasion…that all [present] since have done everything possible to 
demonstrate their sympathy with him, and to give him such support as was within their 
power.”
303
 Another correspondent in London bemoaned, “The Allies have practically recognized 
the National Government of Russia presided over by Admiral Koltchak.  It would have been 
wiser, as well as more manly, had they made the recognition formally and frankly.”
304
     
 The propaganda efforts of the officers of Britmis provided a tremendous amount of 
credibility to the Omsk government within the international community, and most of the Western 
papers drew their information from their reports.  They presented Kolchak as being deeply 
committed to democratic principles and eager to join the European and world political 
community.  Newspapers in the United States picked up many of the stories from British 
correspondents (who were closer to the action than their men based in Vladivostok), and The 
New York Times even encouraged its readers to donate directly to Kolchak’s government and 
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offered the information of a syndicate set up to funnel money to Omsk.
305
 One of France’s most 
read papers, Le Temps, wrote that the Supreme Ruler, “proclaimed complete equality for every 
citizen with a guarantee of all civil liberties, and a national assembly.”
306
 Although some left-
leaning international newspapers, including The Manchester Guardian, viciously criticized 
Kolchak and his attempt to restore the old Tsarist order, many European and American 
newspapers presented an idealized image of the admiral as a staunch defender of democratic 
rights and legal authority. 
 For the Supreme Ruler, commitment to democratic principles meant support for the 
reconvening of the Constituent Assembly, which many across the country still regarded as 
Russia’s last “legal” authority.  In the press, Kolchak was a champion of the institution he and 
others in Omsk formerly despised, and soundly declared Russia could only move forward after 
victory through a “Popular Constituent Assembly.”
307
 He urged the population to embrace these 
democratic ideas, and suggested, "After destroying the Bolshevik autocracy, you, peasants and 
soldiers, immediately start elections for the Constituent Assembly."
308
  The convening of the 
Constituent Assembly would usher in an era of “order, ” and the government that would be set 
up once the Supreme Ruler reached Moscow would be one where, “the ideas of every conscious 
citizen will have power in the Russian state.”
309
 At the State Economic Conference of June 15
th
, 
in a highly symbolic ceremony, the admiral told all those in attendance, “In the near future we 
will invite public figures through elections and other resolutions to the National Constituent 
Assembly, in preparation to solve the questions facing the nation.”
310
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 As seen earlier with Kolchak’s commitment to worker’s rights, the public image of 
Kolchak as a democrat stood in stark contrast with the policies of the Omsk government.  The 
plan for the new Constituent Assembly was not truly democratic, and was slanted heavily in 
favor the Kadets and the upper classes.  Special steps were taken to lessen the influence of rural 
communities (and therefore the peasantry), and all socialist or revolutionary parties would be 
banned.  There was also little guarantee that the government would stand by these commitments, 
with some even publically mocking the notion of the assembly’s convocation.  The regime was 
also deeply hostile to forms of local representative government, with particular animosity 
directed towards the elected zemstvos.  Hiding behind an extensive international propaganda 
campaign, the government stripped the authority of local organs and transferred the 
responsibilities to the Ministry of the Interior and wrote the zemstvos out of the state budget, 
which effectively cut them off any sources of funding.
311
 Despite Kolchak’s claim that “Russia is 
now, and must later be a democratic state,”
312
 the regime remained deeply hostile to democratic 
reforms and the prospect of any transfer of power to an elected assembly. 
 
Conclusion 
 Writing from Kharbin in Manchuria in March 1919, The Times’ special correspondent 
enthusiastically echoed sentiments around the world that there had emerged a new power in 
eastern Russia that could restore order and peace to a country torn apart by civil war: 
He has a great advantage in that he does not seek his own profit.  He would relinquish his great task to-morrow if 
anyone could assume it, but there is none except ambitious adventures to challenge him, and to them he is ruthless.  
Admiral Koltchak has done such wonders in a brief space, his leadership has inspired such confidence and 
enthusiasm, that I came away feeling more hopeful.  If the railway works properly nothing, indeed, can prevent his 
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Unfortunately for Kolchak and the ministers in Omsk, the answer to The Times special 
correspondent’s question was “no.” Despite the massive propaganda that was undertaken by the 
Russian Press Bureau and its departments in Paris, the military defeats the White armies suffered 
in the summer of 1919 also cost the government any prospect of official recognition by the 
Allies.  War weariness from four years of horrific combat and depleted treasury funds persuaded 
many in the Allied governments to avoid any escalation of involvement in Russia, especially 
when the Omsk government estimated at least 40,000 men and supplies would be needed to 
ensure the defeat of the Bolsheviks.
314
 As the Reds penetrated deeper into Siberia, the Allies 
began to sever their ties with the government and evacuate their remaining soldiers to 
Vladivostok.  The two highest ranking Allied generals in Siberia, Janin and Syrovy, were not 
even able (or perhaps willing) to prevent Kolchak’s capture and eventual execution in Irkutsk. 
 Although the Allies never conferred official recognition on Omsk, the regime continued 
to present itself as the only legal authority in Russia, and therefore had the only legit claim to 
state power.  After nearly two years of revolution and upheaval, the Kadets had concluded that 
the reestablishment of law and order was necessary to win the war and to build a strong Russian 
state.  Gosudarstvennost’ meant a commitment to the construction of a powerful national state, 
which must have as its foundation calm and stability from the population.  A military 
dictatorship had been formed not only to defeat the Red Army, but also to the end the political 
instability of party politics and restore order through the stern use of power.  As dictator and 
Supreme Ruler, Admiral Kolchak was presented as the personification of stability and authority.  
In addition to his exploits on the battlefield, the newspapers of Omsk recorded his declarations 
about the construction of the Russian state and the formation of a new Constituent Assembly 
when the army reached Moscow.  He repeatedly signaled his support for democratic principles 
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and advocated for all the land to be given to the peasants, as well as meeting with union leaders 
and championing the cause of workers’ rights.  These “masks” were fashioned by the ideologues 
in Omsk as appeals to the citizens to embrace the rule of law and order, and to demonstrate the 
regime’s commitment to democracy to the Allies. 
 As Richard Wortman has argued, the exercise of power and the “public presentation of 
the mythical image of the ruler were reciprocal processes,” which saw the authority of the leader 
sustained by his idealized and mythical public presentation.
315
 The Omsk government’s measures 
and policies that were undertaken to restore law and order bolstered the mass presentation of 
Kolchak as a statesman who was engineering the construction of a new and strong Russian state.  
The Supreme Ruler made grand appeals to workers and met with union leaders in an attempt to 
demonstrate his commitment to the legal rights of the labor movement, which was designed to 
identify Kolchak with stability and calm and to put a stop to the strikes and unrest that was 
taking a serious toll on economic and social life in Kolchakiia.  Unlike the “mask” of the military 
man, the admiral’s statesman “mask” reflected the regime’s attempt to reconstruct Russian 
society and the Russian state around the set of idealized concepts of law and order.  While the 
image of the admiral as a military man communicated Kolchak’s bravery, loyalty, and service in 
the fight against Bolshevism, the “mask” of the statesman contained symbolic overtures to the 
construction of the state and the “responsibility” and “duty” of citizens to participate in Russia’s 
future by supporting “healthy” state elements. 
 Through daily newspapers and brochures produced by the Russian Press Bureau in 
Omsk, a highly stylized representation of the Supreme Ruler was produced to bolster the 
government’s international claims to legitimate authority and to solidify popular support for the 
resurrection of the Russian state.  The language surrounding Kolchak included slogans such as 
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“order” (poryadok) and “statemindedness” (gosudarstvennost’), which were starkly contrasted 
with images of the Bolsheviks as “anarchists” (anarkhisty) who were bent on destroying the 
Motherland.  He was also presented as being a strong proponent of free trade and the 
development of healthy economy, which would contribute to the normalization of societal and 
political relations and help law the foundations for a strong state.  Kolchak served as the head of 
several high-profile economic councils that were accompanied by ceremonial demonstrations of 
his power, and the government maintained close public and private ties with major industrial and 
finance leaders who had fled the onslaught of the Red Army.  Economic developments in free 
trade and industry were often connected to the expanded power of representative bodies, and the 
Supreme Ruler, under pressure from both the Allies and businessmen in Omsk, came out 
strongly in support of “democratic principles” and the convocation of a new Constituent 
Assembly.  The admiral’s democratic “masks” were perhaps the most artificial of those 
constructed by the Omsk ideologues, as the regime was increasingly hostile to any attempts to 
infringe upon its absolute authority, and as the military situation deteriorated the authorities 
increasingly resorted to draconian punitive measures against local governments and advocates of 
more representation. 
   The image of the Supreme Ruler as a statesman was a manifestation of the Omsk 
government’s attempts to portray its legitimacy and solidify its position as the leading anti-
Bolshevik movement in Russia.  Kolchak’s public stances on law and order, democracy, and 
economic stability were crafted as a message to audiences both domestically and abroad about 
the legal foundations and strength of the regime.  This message was also meant to communicate 
an alternative vision of the future of the Russian state that extended beyond the military defeat of 
the Bolsheviks.  As they were keenly aware of the dangers of being labeled restorationists and 
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monarchists, the Kadets who fashioned the image of the Supreme Ruler went to great lengths to 
distance their movement from the Tsarist past and instead developed another path for Russia’s 
future that was based on the strength of simple and ambiguous notions like law and order and 
respect for state authority.  Although this vision failed to garner sufficient popular support 
domestically or internationally, the very act of constructing an idealized image of the Supreme 
Ruler as a synecdoche for Russia’s future demonstrated the Whites were not simply revanchist 
monarchists, but rather competing revolutionaries with a unique vision who sought to shape 





















 The development of the two “masks” of Admiral Kolchak, the military man and the 
statesman, must be viewed as part of the “cult of personality” phenomenon that unfolded during 
the First World War and the subsequent revolutions.  Nicholas II was the first Tsar to embrace 
modern forms of media and mass culture to supplement his identification with power and the 
national myths developed around the autocrat.  The image of Nicholas II was ubiquitous in 
newspapers in the beginning of the 20
th
 century, and the Tsar and his advisors shaped a “scenario 
of power” around Nicholas’ connection to the people and his connections to the national myths 
of Russia and autocracy.  The increased exposure of the ordained monarch had negative 
consequences, however, as the new forms of mass media and press desacralized the holy image 
of the Tsar by diminishing the uniqueness of his image.
316
 Despite the argument that the over 
production of symbols of the monarchy and the body of Nicholas himself, the Tsar’s use of 
newspapers to disseminate images of power and ceremony helped foster the “monarchial 
psychology” of the Russian people in regards towards forms of government, which left the 
peasants “receptive to authoritarian or patriarchal leaders.”
317
 Many people’s first contact with 
newspapers came with propaganda or articles about the Tsar, and the leaders of the revolutions 
of 1917 largely continued the trend of using the press, symbols, and ceremony to appeal to the 
uprooted masses of Russia. 
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 The February Revolution and the overthrow of the Tsar left Alexander Kerensky as the 
key figure of the Provisional Government, and he developed an extensive personality cult as a 
symbol of the revolution and republican ideals.  Kerensky benefitted from the political confusion 
that arose of the deposition of the monarch, with many in the country not fully grasping the 
transition of power that had occurred and its implications; as one soldier famously said, “Yes, we 
need a republic, but at its head should be a good Tsar.”
318
 The image of Kerensky as the 
embodiment of the revolution was spread among the people with amazing speed, and he became 
symbolically linked with power, the military, and the people.  His speeches were printed and 
distributed among both civilians and the soldiers at the front, who were especially receptive to 
Kerensky’s “masks.” Kerensky’s main opponents, Lavr Kornilov and Vladimir Lenin, also 
cultivated their own stylized images and personality cults in attempts to garner support from an 
increasing polarized society.  While the Bolsheviks were the known masters of propaganda and 
agitation (and with the cult of Lenin established during the revolution surviving until 1991), 
those in the anti-Bolshevik movement rallied around the famous general Kornilov, and 
developed a personality cult for him among right-wing circles and officers.
319
 The death of 
Kornilov (and soon thereafter Mikhail Alekseev) in the early stages of the civil war left the door 
open for a new symbolic leader to take power in Russia and defeat Bolshevism. 
 After the coup d’état of November 18
th
, Admiral Aleksandr Kolchak assumed the title of 
Supreme Ruler of All-Russia and the leadership of the anti-Bolshevik movement throughout 
Russia.  From the first hours after the overthrow of the Directory, the Omsk government utilized 
the press and daily newspapers to distribute and disseminate a highly stylized image of Kolchak 
that reflected the minister’s conception of power and legitimate authority.  Although a “cult of 
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personality” by Jan Plamper’s definition never fully emerged for the admiral, this resulted from 
the fall of his government and his subsequent execution, not a lack of effort from the Russian 
Press Bureau.  Like previous leaders before him, the image of the Supreme Ruler was created not 
only to publicize Kolchak and gain recognition for the government domestically and abroad, but 
also to elucidate the ideological positions of the movement and its vision for the future of Russia.  
While Lenin’s cult of personality centered on the revolution and his leadership of the Communist 
Party, Kolchak’s “masks” were shaped by a section of the Kadet party who believed that military 
dictatorship and the preservation of law and order were the only salvation for the nation. 
 The two “masks” of the Admiral Kolchak were created to reflect the ideological 
foundations of the Omsk government, and the regime utilized the press under their control 
(through the Russian Press Bureau) to distribute propaganda and literature about the Supreme 
Ruler both at home and abroad.  Tsarist marching songs were stripped of their monarchial 
trappings and supplanted with apolitical lyrics about the admiral during the First World War, 
demonstrating his bravery and leadership in a time of troubles.  Kadet and other right-wing 
intellectuals declaring their support for this new vision of state and society wrote brochures and 
articles in support of Kolchak’s government, while the British in Omsk and Russians in Paris 
spread stylized writings among the Allies.  Elaborate ceremonies were constructed to portray 
Kolchak was the descendant of the historical tradition of ruler-liberators of Russia, such as his 
convocation of the State Economic Conference, which saw the Supreme Ruler seated on a stage 
beneath a massive portrait of Alexander II.  He was presented in the papers as a simple soldier 
who, in the mold of Cincinnatus and George Washington, had been called on by the people to 
rescue the nation at its critical hour.  Kolchak was also stylized as a representative of the Russian 
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of the state, the embodiment of law and order, who actively urged the citizens to participate in 
the construction of the future through the new Constituent Assembly. 
 The two stylized representations of Admiral Kolchak were “masks” in several senses.  
They were an artificial construction applied by outside forces, which were keen to create a “key 
symbol” for the anti-Bolshevik movement that would provide a rallying point for those who 
sought to overturn the gains of the October Revolution.
320
  Like masks worn by actors on a stage 
production, Kolchak had little involvement in the creation of the “mask” he wore.  Although 
many of the symbols associated with the Supreme Ruler were drawn from his distinguished past, 
the self-admittedly politically naïve admiral had little interest in propaganda and politics, and 
perhaps to a fault left this and many other aspects of rule to his subordinate ministers.  Finally, a 
mask is often created to obscure what lies beneath; the public presentation of Admiral Kolchak 
was often at stark odds with the realities of the government’s policies and the military’s actions.  
Despite the public claim that both the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and the Russian Army 
were totally apolitical in nature, the military authorities’ antagonism of civilian authorities, 
workers, and anyone with suspected socialist leaning left many distrustful if not outright hostile 
to the military regime.  The regime’s resistance to any concessions regarding representative 
assemblies during the civil war contradicted the Supreme Ruler’s declarations in support of 
democracy and the Constituent Assembly.  The government’s vacillating and opaque stance on 
the land question lent little credibility to Kolchak’s frequent statements about “all land to the 
working peoples!”    
 Despite the defeat of the Kolchak’s government and the lack of development of a true 
cult of personality, the imagery and symbols of the Supreme Ruler of All-Russia must be situated 
within the dynamic development of political ideology and the mass media during the tumultuous 
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revolutionary period in Russia.  The mass produced and remarkably consistent images of power 
that were produced by the Omsk regime demonstrate that, contrary to previous assessments, the 
Whites understood the power that propaganda and political symbolism conferred, and they 
participated in the process of the “aestheticization of politics” in an attempt to reach and 
influence the people.
321
  Admiral Kolchak and the Omsk government deserve to be included in 
scholarly discussions of ideology and authority during the civil war, and the modern use of 
propaganda and newspapers to mobilize populations in support of a cause.  A more refined 
understanding and comprehension of the motivations and ideas of all sides of the civil war 
provides the ability to contextualize all of the events and actors within a wider scope of historical 
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